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I. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. states have little money to spare on risky innovations in 
emerging fields such as alternative energy production and water 
reclamation.
1
  Yet, each year states offer up billions of dollars in 
financial incentives such as research and development (R&D) tax credits 
in order to encourage businesses to locate and invest in their 
jurisdictions.
2
  In granting such incentives, states hope to imitate the 
success of “innovation clusters” like Silicon Valley.
3
  However, some 
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 1.  For recent figures on state finances, see AUDREY WALL, THE BOOK OF THE STATES ch. 7 
(2010), available at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/content/state-budgets-2009-and-2010 
(providing figures on State revenues and economic projections).   
 2.  See Louise Story, The Empty Promise of Tax Incentives: Governments Give Up $80 Billion 
a Year, but Jobs Can Still Vanish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012, at A1, A32–A33 (collecting new data 
set and reporting that in 2012 state and local governments gave up $80 billion in business 
incentives). 
 3.  “Innovation clusters” are generally defined as regional concentrations of large and small 
companies that develop creative products and services, along with related firms, suppliers and 
institutions.  Mark Muro & Bruce Katz, The New ‘Cluster Moment’: How Regional Innovation 
Clusters Can Foster the Next Economy, BROOKINGS, Sept. 2010, at 10, available at 
http://www.wedc.wa.gov/Download%20files/2010.09-ClusterMoment-Brookings.pdf.  On current 
state and national policies for growing innovation clusters, see GROWING INNOVATION CLUSTERS 
FOR AMERICAN PROSPERITY: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES SYMPOSIUM ON 
INNOVATION CLUSTERS AND BEST PRACTICE IN STATE AND REGIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES 3–
6 [hereinafter “NAS SYMPOSIUM”].  See also ANALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: 
CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 30–37 (2d ed. 2006) (examining 
the mobility of executives in a technology cluster); SUZANNE BERGER & THE MIT INDUSTRIAL 
PERFORMANCE CENTER, HOW WE COMPETE 216–22 (2006) (discussing economic effect of 
globalization on technological innovation); EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 29–34 (2011) 
(tracing the creation of Silicon Valley); BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN 
REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE 
ECONOMY 22, 114–15, n.1 (2013) (discussing cities’ efforts to grow innovation clusters and 
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argue state R&D tax credits, which are generally based on minimal 
qualifying criteria and given without strings attached,
4
 are costly for local 
taxpayers and do not reliably lead to increased investment in new 
research, let alone true “innovation”
5
 within the state.
6
  Moreover, 
according to some legal scholars and economists, R&D tax credits have 
little effect on national levels of research spending; they may simply shift 
investment from one state to another, producing a zero sum competition 
for the same business activity.
7
 
This Article proposes that state patents, a sui generis innovation 
incentive with longstanding precedent in history, could provide an 
effective supplement to U.S. patents and non-patent incentives such as 
tax credits and research grants for encouraging firms and individuals to 
invest in developing and commercializing new technologies.  Patents 
could provide states with a new tool for growing regional clusters of 
                                                          
districts). 
 4.  Most states use the same criteria as the federal R&D tax credit, though ,many states require 
the research to be performed in the state.  See MICHAEL D. RASHKIN, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TAX INCENTIVES: FEDERAL, STATE, AND FOREIGN 275–532 (2007) 
(providing a comprehensive survey of state R&D tax credits). 
 5.  In this Article I loosely rely on the basic Schumpeterian definition of “innovation” as a 
temporal process in which inventions (patentable as well as unpatentable) are developed and 
transformed into useful technologies, products and services with commercial value.  See F.M. 
SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 1–31 (1984) (explaining the 
concept of Schumpeterian innovation); see also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent 
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 807 (1988) (discussing 
distinctions between invention and innovation). 
 6.  For example, California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) concluded in 2003 that the 
state should abolish its R&D tax credit.  See Legislative Analyst’s Office, An Overview of 
California’s Reasearch & Development Tax Credit (Nov. 2003), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2003/randd_credit/113003_research_development.html.  The LAO noted that 
state-level subsidization of R&D activities is difficult to justify, both because of the difficulty of 
determining the appropriate level for the credit and because benefits, such as knowledge spillovers, 
cannot be confined to the state.  Id.  See also Steven Singer, State Officials Study Abolishing Several 
Tax Credits, THE HOUR (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.thehour.com/news/norwalk/state-
officials-study-abolishing-several-tax-credits/article_67121baf-2728-57b5-b228-2dc5c0296fec.html 
(discussing a report by Department of Economic and Community Development casting doubt on 
efficacy of Connecticut R&D tax credit). 
 7.  Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Restraints on State 
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 396–99 (1996); Walter Hellerstein & Daniel T. 
Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 789, 790–93 (1996) (discussing state economic incentives in relation to economic 
development).  See also Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and 
Aggregate Effects of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 431, 433 fig. 1 (2009) (finding 
evidence of increased in-state investment but that the net effect on R&D spending as a result of state 
R&D tax credits is close to zero).  But see Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate 
Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447 (1997) (arguing locational incentives 
can produce agglomeration advantages at more socially optimal levels than would otherwise occur).  
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innovators in certain sectors, such as agricultural technology in 
California or orthopedic devices in Indiana,
8
 and for promoting 
investment in provisioning of local public goods.
9
  State patents could 
also provide a variety of other federalism-related benefits, including 
increased individual choice and a new avenue for patent law reform.
10
  
Especially given the continued move towards global uniformity, patent 
law could benefit from the policy experiments that divergent state patent 
regimes would produce, turning the states into decentralized 
“laboratories”
11
 for improving the functioning of patent law.
12
 
In making these arguments, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part II 
discusses the key difference between U.S. patents and historic state and 
colonial patents.  Part III explains that, despite the availability of U.S. 
patents, concurrent state patents can still play a crucial role in promoting 
                                                          
 8.  Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Nov. 1998, at 82. 
 9.  See DENNIS MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 77–83 (1996) (discussing 
federalism and its effect on local governments and economies); John C. Yoo, The Judicial 
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1402–03 (1997) (arguing state government 
policies may create “overall efficiency for the entire system in the long run”); ROBERT COOTER, THE 
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 105–06, 129–30 (2000) (citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (discussing local public goods)). 
 10.  See Camilla A. Hrdy, Dissenting State Patent Regimes, 3 IP THEORY 78 (2013), available 
at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol3/iss2/2 (discussing the benefits of state 
experimentation in granting patents); infra Part V.C. 
 11.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel, social, and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”). 
 12.  See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 1–3, 13–20 (Sept. 15, 2013) (draft) 
(Yale Law School Information Society Project), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294774 (presenting a new “experimentalist” 
approach to global patent laws and a summary of scholarship on the states as “natural experiments” 
for testing innovation policies).  See also John Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 693–700 (2002) (presenting a variety of arguments in favor of more 
diverse national patent laws and a detailed discussion of the potential for nations to serve as 
“laboratories” of policy experimentation); Craig Nard & John Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1619, 1620–23 (2007) (suggesting that many of the U.S. 
patent system’s flaws can be linked to over-centralization, and proposing multiple patent appellate 
courts as a potential solution); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 
IND. L.J. 449, 451 (2010) (arguing that a “local patent-reform process” involving participation from 
federal district court judges and local bar associations has improved the procedures for litigating 
patents and reduced the costs of patent litigation); Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent 
Laboratories, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 307, 307–22 (2011) (arguing that district courts play an 
important role in tailoring patent laws to specific industries and technologies); Jeanne C. Fromer, 
Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1447–48 (2010) [hereinafter Fromer, Patentography] 
(arguing that, by restricting venue in patent cases to defendants’ principal place of business, district 
courts can act as “patent laboratories” for the federal circuit, becoming more skilled at adjudicating 
patent cases in particular technologies or industries). 
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innovation due to the localized nature of innovations and the 
communities that produce them;
13
 the fact that some innovation does not 
require, and may not benefit from, full internalization of the benefits of 
the innovation;
14
 and the continuing problem of underinvestment in 
certain types of innovations, including but not limited to unpatentable 
inventions.
15
  Part IV discusses one potential version of a state patent 
system, loosely based on the four distinguishing features of historic state 
and colonial patents: local utility requirements, flexible standards of 
novelty, local working requirements, and tailored scopes and term 
lengths. 
Part V discusses current legal limits on state patents, including 
TRIPS, antritrust law, and, most significantly, the IP Clause and the U.S. 
Patent Act.  The Supreme Court has held that states cannot grant “patent-
like” rights against the world that would potentially compete with U.S. 
patents as incentives to invest in a particular endeavor or a particular type 
of endeavor.
16
  As explained in Part V.C., this rule should be overruled or 
significantly limited in its scope.
17
  Instead, this Article proposes a new 
approach to preemption of state patents that asks whether a state patent 
directly conflicts with an existing U.S. patent or violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause.
18
  As explained in Part V.D., the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s more deferential, political process-based approach to judicial 
review, which focuses mainly on protecting out-of-state businesses and 
consumers from negative externalities produced by state laws, more 
                                                          
 13.  See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 3, at 216 (discussing reasons for outsourcing and why certain 
production jobs remain in the U.S.).  
 14.  Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 281 (2007). 
 15.  See Douglas G. Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 693, 693 (1997) (proposing allowing state anti-copying laws to promote 
investment in unpatentable goods); Arthur Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the 
Mind: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 703 (2006) (proposing stronger 
state laws for prohibiting copying of undeveloped ideas); Ben Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the 
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 504 (2009) (proposing FDA-administered periods 
of exclusivity for unpatentable drugs); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
341, 341 (2010) [hereinafter Sichelman, Commercializing Patents] (proposing a new system of 
commercializing patents to facilitate commercialization of unworked U.S. patents). 
 16.  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151, 160–61, 165 (1989) 
(discussing dangers of state-created “patent-like” rights).  For a discussion of the Court’s restrictive 
stance in Bonito, see Lichtman, supra note 15, at 697–700, 714–15 (arguing that Bonito was wrongly 
decided, and that states should be able to prevent at least some forms of copying of unpatentable 
innovations in particularly vulnerable markets). 
 17.  See Lichtman, supra note 15, at 714 (discussing the dangers of a strict approach to 
preemption).   
 18.  An additional limit, discussed in Part V.D.1, infra, is that an inventor cannot rely on a state 
patent and a federal patent at the same time for the same invention. 
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precisely addresses the risks of state patents than the patent preemption 
doctrine.
19
 The Article then provides a simple, three-part framework for 
individualized judicial review of state patents under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  In sum, this new approach would help courts weed 
out overly burdensome patents, while still allowing states to exercise 
significant autonomy in granting patents and deriving efficient policies 
for promoting local innovation. 
II. AMERICA’S DUAL PATENT REGIMES 
State patents are similar to U.S. patents in that they entail the right to 
exclude others from using a patentable or unpatentable innovation within 
the jurisdiction, with the general purpose of rewarding and incenting 
generation and development of innovations.
20
  However, unlike U.S. 
patents, state patents can be granted for innovations that do not meet 
federal criteria of patentability and they may have a variety of features—
such as local working clauses and tailored term lengths—that distinguish 
them from their federal counterparts.  This part explains the key 
differences between modern U.S. patents and historic state and colonial 
patents, why the Framers chose to transition to a national patent system 
in 1788, and finally why states largely stopped granting patents once 
federal patents became available. 
A. U.S. Patents 
The IP Clause gives Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”
21
  The Patent Act, first passed in 1790, gives inventors the 
opportunity to obtain exclusive rights to make, use, and sell inventions 
meeting the Patent Act’s criteria of patentability.
22
  Today, the main 
                                                          
 19.  See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 7, at 450 (explaining that the dormant Commerce Clause is 
concerned mainly with the negative effects that state business incentives can produce for out-of-
staters, who are unprotected by the political process in the state that granted the incentive). 
 20.  See Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 158 (distinguishing state “patent-like” rights such as 
Florida’s anti-molding statute from state unfair competition laws based on the reasoning that, “[i]n 
contrast to the operation of unfair competition law, the Florida statute is aimed directly at preventing 
the exploitation of the design and utilitarian conceptions embodied in the product itself” in order “to 
create an inducement for the improvement of boat hull designs”). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 22.  See Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (granting various rights to inventors); 
Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (clarifying patent rights and the method to resolve 
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patentability criteria are novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.
23
  Inventors 
also must disclose their inventions in sufficient detail for “one of 
ordinary skill in the art” to replicate and practice it.
24
 
According to modern patent theory, patents promote innovation by 
providing an incentive to invent, an incentive to commercialize, and an 
incentive to disclose technical information to the public.
25
  But U.S. 
patents represent a uniquely hands-off form of innovation incentive.
26
  
U.S. patents are standardized, one-size-fits-all rights granted based on 
neutral criteria like novelty and nonobviouness.
27
  An applicant cannot 
obtain a patent for inventions that do not meet these criteria, regardless 
of the invention’s potential value to society.
28
  Moreover, U.S. patent 
holders have no affirmative duty to practice the invention anywhere, let 
alone within a particular geographical area.
29
  In fact—due to global 
harmonization of patent laws that make it easier for patent holders to 
extend exclusive rights into foreign jurisdictions—inventors are just as 
likely to market their inventions in other nations as in the United States.
30
 
For these reasons, although U.S. patents create incentives to develop 
innovations that can be protected and monetized in as many markets as 
                                                          
patent disputes). 
 23.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006) (outlining patent criteria). 
 24.  See id. § 112 (requiring inventors to provide adequate details of product for replication). 
 25.  S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 20–21 (Comm. Print 1958) (written by Fritz Machlup) (summarizing 
economic justifications for patents). 
 26.  See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 6–7 & n.16 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that, from the start, U.S. patent law was based on 
a “minimalist” view of government involvement in the economy and only “indirectly” rewarded 
innovation); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
247, 248–49 (1994) (explaining that patent law operates according to legal doctrine and not through 
typical administrative means).  
 27.  35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103; see also Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of 
Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 861–78 (2006) (laying out the 
problem of “uniformity cost” in IP and discussing its contours in detail for each of the IP regimes, 
including patent law).   
 28.  See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became 
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 243 (2004) [hereinafter 
Commodification of Patents] (observing that, unlike modern U.S. patents, early patent privileges 
were focused on the “public good” and “not limited to a narrow conception of economic or 
technological innovation”). 
 29.   The Patent Act requires, at most, only a “constructive reduction” in the application, which 
means disclosure of the technology that would allow one of ordinary skill in the art to reduce the 
invention to practice.  Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 75, 89–90 (2008). 
 30.  For a discussion of the Paris Convention Treaty and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 
see Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization: The Necessity and 
Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 127, 138–44 (2011). 
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possible, they do not create any particular incentive to invest in 
innovations of importance to certain communities; nor do they create 
obligations for patentees to practice their inventions in a particular 
locality. 
B.  State and Colonial Patents 
The patents granted by the states and American colonies prior to the 
Constitution provided similar economic incentives to modern U.S. 
patents but with significant differences.
31
 State patents conferred the 
exclusive right (or privilege) to use an invention or innovation in the 
state.
32
  The main purpose was to encourage local use of technology that 
would likely benefit the local community.
33
  Four essential features 
differentiated state patents from U.S. patents. 
First, state patents had a local utility requirement, which indicated 
the state believed the invention would add value to the community and 
improve standards of living.
34
  For example, in 1787, Pennsylvania 
granted a twenty-one year patent for an angle-measuring device that the 
inventor attested would supply an “instrumental solution of all cases of 
trigonometry” that might arise in surveying land in the state.
35
 
Second, due to flexible standards of patentability, states had 
                                                          
 31.  On state and colonial patents in early America, see BRUCE BUGBEE, GENESIS OF 
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 57–103 (1967); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early 
Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 615, 616 n.4 (1996) (noting that early state and colonial grants of limited monopoly rights 
were not patents for “inventions” in the modern sense). 
 32.  Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
45, 58–59 (2013) [hereinafter Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire].   
 33.  Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 97–103 
(June 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Owning Ideas], 
available at www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/obracha/dissertation.  On privileges and privilege-granting 
regimes, see Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and 
Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1138 (2006) (arguing that early privileges emphasized local utility 
rather than disclosure of new information); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 953, 968 (2007) (describing the continued use of the term “privilege” despite the change in the 
nature of patents).  See also Sean O’Connor & Ted Sichelman, Patents as Promoters of 
Competition: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1267, 1268–69 (2012) (noting that, “[u]nlike today’s patent systems—which solely encompass 
negative rights to exclude against the backdrop of a generally free market,” Venetian patents 
provided a positive right “which allowed the patent holder to compete in an otherwise regulated 
system dominated by the guilds”). 
 34.  See Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 100. 
 35.  See BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 91 (describing George Wall, Jr.’s 1787 Pennsylvania 
patent). 
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discretion to grant patents for inventions that were already being used in 
foreign jurisdictions so long as the invention was new to the colony and a 
patent might give someone an incentive to develop it and make it locally 
available.
36
  If there was a standard of patentability, the important 
question was not whether an invention was new, let alone “nonobvious.”  
Instead, it was whether a patent was necessary for inducing the use of the 
invention in the jurisdiction.
37
 
Third, as part of their focus on local development, state patents 
imposed various local working requirements that obligated patentees to 
successfully develop and practice their technology in the granting state, 
or at least to allow others to do so for a reasonable price.
38
  Nearly all 
colonial patents, and many state patents, contained explicit local working 
clauses that required perfection of an invention within a certain 
timeframe.
39
  Some state patents even required that patentees teach their 
art to local workers.
40
  And nearly all came with fixed maximum 
penalties for infringement, which meant that others knew how much it 
would cost to infringe the patent and would not necessarily have to 
forego their own infringing operations in the state as a result of a 
patentee’s refusal to license his invention on reasonable terms.
41
 
The final feature distinguishing state patents from U.S. patents was 
that their terms and scopes were not standardized.  Rather, they were 
specifically tailored to meet the needs of the patentee and the particular 
technology at issue, with patent terms oscillating between seven and 
twenty years.
42
  In short, as Oren Bracha wrote, early patent-granting 
                                                          
 36.  See Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 99 (explaining the concept of “invention” employed in 
colonies signaled the introduction of a new trade or industry).  For a general discussion of “patents 
of importation,” see Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 860–78 (1998). 
 37.  See Biagioli, supra note 33, at 1142–444 (explaining that under a privilege system, the 
focus was “novelty relative to a place”); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 26, at 6 (“Under the original 
patent systems, the society’s benefit was the introduction of a new art or technology into the 
country.”). 
 38.  BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 57–103.  See also Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 103 
(discussing colonial working clauses and apprentice clauses). 
 39.  For example, Henry Guest’s five-year New Jersey patent on a method of making whale oil 
granted in 1780 required him to construct his plant for making the oil within the state and commence 
operations within eight months.  BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 86. 
 40.  See, e.g., id. at 100 (describing Oliver Evans’ 1789 New Hampshire patent, which required 
Evans to arrange for a trained maker of the invention to reside within the state until the seven-year 
term expired). 
 41.  Id. at 84–103 (cataloguing predetermined infringement penalties for state patents). 
 42.  Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 100–01.  Notably, state patents in the 1780s, presumably 
following the British practice, began to settle on fourteen-year periods.  BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 
93–94. 
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authorities were “in charge of a specific calculus of the public good in 
each case, considering whether a patent was justified and what its 
specific terms should be.”
43
 
C. State Patents Following Ratification of the Constitution 
If states already granted their own patents, why did the Framers 
decide to give the new national government the specific power to grant 
its own patents in the Constitution?
44
  The main reason, according to 
historians of U.S. patent law, is that state patents did not span a broad 
enough jurisdiction to effectively protect inventors from copying once 
the states began trading more actively with one another toward the end of 
the 18th century.
45
  This situation prompted American inventors to lobby 
for national protection.
46
  At least some of the Framers agreed, as 
evidenced by James Madison’s famous comment in the Federalist No. 
43, that, due to their limited jurisdiction, “[t]he States cannot separately 
make effectual provision for either of the cases [patent or copyright].”
47
  
No one objected when the IP Clause gave the national government the 
power to grant patents. 
Nonetheless, when drafting the IP Clause, the Framers deliberately 
left states independent authority to grant patents.
48
  The extent to which 
states could exercise this authority without conflicting with federal patent 
law remained a contentious issue.  Several states continued to grant 
patents even after Congress passed the Patent Act in 1790;
49
 and the 
                                                          
 43.  Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 101. 
 44.  U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. 
 45.  See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 76–
77 (2002) [hereinafter NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE] (summing up the defects of a state run patent 
system); BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 90 (noting the limits of state patents and inventors’ attempts to 
buy up patents from multiple states). 
 46.  See Michael F. Martin, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of Its 
Origin, 49 IDEA 435, 461–66 (2009) (describing the influence of inventors like John Fitch who 
advocated for federal patents to protect their rights in their inventions). 
 47.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa43.htm. 
 48.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (failing 
to mention state authority to grant patents); Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 
supra note 32, at 71–75 (explaining that the IP Clause did not grant an exclusive power to the federal 
government); Maya Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual 
Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond A Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 301 (1995) (noting decision to leave states with 
concurrent power to grant IP rights). 
 49.  P. J. Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166, 167–69 (1931); 
BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 102. 
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second Congress did not preempt states from doing so in the second 
Patent Act of 1793.
50
  Instead, Congress clarified that inventors seeking 
U.S. patents had to relinquish any state patents they already possessed 
for the same invention.
51
  In 1812, the New York Supreme Court, led by 
Chief Justice James Kent, unanimously upheld Robert Livingston and 
Robert Fulton’s New York patent on the steamboat.
52
  According to 
Kent’s oft-cited opinion in Livingston v. Van Ingen, depriving states of 
autonomy to grant patents “would [leave] the states in a condition of 
singular and contemptible imbecility.”
53
 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Thomas Gibbons challenged the steamboat 
patent in federal court.
54
  In his oral argument, the Attorney General of 
the United States William Wirt argued that, based on Congress’s powers 
under the IP Clause and the Patent Act, states’ powers to grant patents 
were fully preempted.
55
  But Chief Justice John Marshall ignored the 
Attorney General’s arguments and declined to overrule or even address 
Justice Kent’s strongly worded support for concurrent state patent 
powers.
56
  Nearly ten years later, future Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Story explicitly endorsed Kent’s view of concurrent power in his 1833 
Commentaries on the United States Constitution.
57
  The Supreme Court 
cited to Kent’s opinion as late as 1878.
58
  Livingston’s holding that states 




III. THE NEED FOR STATE PATENTS TODAY 
This Article does not dispute the necessity of a broad and uniform 
                                                          
 50.  Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793 § 7, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323. 
 51.  NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE, supra note 45, at 437 & n.8 (describing the 1793 Act’s 
voidance clause). 
 52.  Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 581–85 (N.Y. 1812) (James Kent, C.J.). 
 53.  Id. at 584. 
 54.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 221. 
 57.  See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Book 
III, Ch. XIX, at 79 (Boston, 4th ed. 1873) (agreeing with Kent that states can concurrently grant 
patents to introducers and “possessors” of technology). 
 58.  See Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1878) (citing Livingston v. Van Ingen 9 
Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812)) (explaining that the holding of Livingston is entitled to “great weight”). 
 59.  See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154, 165 (1989) (noting 
the IP Clause does not deprive states of the power to use IP laws to promote intellectual creation in 
their own territories). 
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national patent system.  Given the externalities associated with the 
creation of new inventions and the difficulty of protecting them in an 
interstate market—along with the heavy administrative cost of multiple 
state patent offices—it would be expensive, inconvenient, and socially 
wasteful if inventors had to rely solely on a patchwork of state rights.
60
  
Given that the U.S. government now grants patents of national 
jurisdiction, and U.S. states have not concurrently granted patents since 
the early 19th century, it might be assumed that concurrent state patent 
regimes are unnecessary and obsolete.  Since most inventions can 
potentially be marketed in interstate commerce, why would any inventor 
seek only state-level exclusivity?  Since states cannot internalize all the 
benefits of the research and information produced by state patents, why 
would any state agree to grant such a right?  Finally, if states did start 
granting patents, why should federal courts permit such laws to survive 
preemption under the Patent Act and the dormant Commerce Clause? 
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed these questions in 1973 in 
Goldstein v. California, where the Court had to decide whether a 
California law could prohibit unauthorized copying of sound recordings, 
even though the Copyright Act was silent on this issue.
61
  Upholding the 
California law, the Court explained that states possess concurrent 
authority to grant intellectual property (IP) rights in their own 
jurisdictions.
62
  Although the Court distinguished prior case law 
respecting states’ concurrent authority in patent law,
63
 in reaching its 
                                                          
 60.  NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE, supra note 45, at 76–77.  See also Duffy, supra note 12, at 
693–703 (listing the three major justifications for global harmonization of patent law as the inability 
of localized patent systems to protect technical information in global markets, the inefficiencies 
associated with multiple patent offices reviewing and granting patents, and the risk of destructive 
protectionism); Chun, supra note 30, at 130–37 (asserting that the major benefits of patent law 
harmonization are to ensure patent protection in foreign markets and to reduce the costs of patenting 
and doing business). 
 61.  412 U.S. 546, 551–52 (1973). 
 62.  Id. at 571 (holding that California exercised a power “retained under the Constitution”).  
See Arthur Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 705, 748–49 (2006) (discussing Goldstein’s implications for preemption 
of state laws prohibiting copying of undeveloped ideas). 
 63.  Distinguishing its prior decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 
(1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964), the Court explained that U.S. 
copyright law did not address sound recordings at all, and never said they could not be copyrighted.  
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569.  In contrast, the Court stated, the Patent Act “indicated not only which 
articles in this particular category Congress wished to protect, but which configurations it wished to 
remain free.”  Id.  The Court provided no basis for this distinction, simply suggesting that the Patent 
Act creates a negative inference that any objects that do not meet the federal standards of 
patentability cannot be similarly protected by state laws—even though the Patent Act, unlike the 
Copyright Act, has no express preemption provision. 
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decision, the Goldstein Court made several observations that explain why 
states should retain some autonomy to grant their own patents. 
A. The Local Nature of Innovation 
The Court’s first observation was that, even in an interstate and 
global economy, not all innovations are of national importance, or of 
equal importance to all states.
64
  Quoting Chief Justice John Marshall in 
Gibbons, the Court stated that “the basic principle of federalism” is that 
the federal government’s 
‘action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to 
those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to 
those which are completely within a particular State, which do not 
affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for 




This distinction between objects of national and local importance is 
highly relevant to patent law as well as copyright.  In explaining that the 
IP Clause does not preclude states from protecting expressive works like 
sound recordings, the Court explained that, although the Clause 
“recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it does not 
indicate that all ‘writings’ are of national interest or that state legislation 
is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded.”
66
  To the contrary, the Court 
stated, “[t]he patents granted by the States in the 18th century show . . . a 
willingness on the part of the States to promote those portions of science 
and the arts which were of local importance.”
67
 
Today, even more so than in the 1800s, technological innovation is a 
local enterprise, both with respect to innovations themselves and with 
respect to the communities that produce innovation.
68
  Many examples of 
                                                          
 64.  Id. at 557–58. 
 65.  Id. at 554 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195 (1824)). 
 66.  Id. at 556–57. 
 67.  Id. at 557. 
 68.  See id. at 557–58 (noting that increased diversity across the 50 states today means some 
innovations will be of “purely local importance”).  See also Miller, supra note 62, at 749 (“[T]he 
fruits of intellectual labor constitute a large share of our national wealth, necessitating careful policy 
formulation. . . . [T]he industries associated with this vast creative output are distributed unevenly 
throughout the United States—with some states, like California and New York (and more recently 
Illinois and Texas), forming the home bases for a disproportionate number of creativity-driven 
enterprises and a large share of the idea marketplace.”).  John Duffy has also observed that an 
important limitation on the argument that patent externalities justify a global patent regime is that 
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geographically localized innovations exist in the agricultural sector, for 
instance, such as the special rootstock grafts designed by researchers at 
the University of California, Davis to combat nematodes and fungi that 
decimate grapes in Northern California.
69
  The oil and gas industry, 
which generally relies on immobile resources, is full of examples, such 
as new drilling methods like “fracking.”
70
  Perhaps most importantly 
from the perspective of cash-strapped states and cities, many of the 
technologies related to infrastructure and “local public goods” (e.g. 




The communities responsible for the generation of innovation are 
also often geographically localized.
72
  As Michael Porter puts it, from the 
aircraft equipment and design companies located in Seattle, to the 
companies researching advanced materials in Pittsburg, “[t]oday’s 
economic map of the world is dominated by . . . clusters.”
73
  Many of 
these clusters are centered specifically around universities in order to 
benefit from proximity to talent and the potential for knowledge 
spillovers.
74
  As Suzanne Berger and her team at MIT recently 
                                                          
technical knowledge developed as a result of a patent system does not necessarily benefit everyone 
in the world equally.  Duffy, supra note 12, at 699.  Jeanne Fromer’s data on patent litigation in the 
district courts shows that there is “a good deal of technology-specific clustering of patent litigation 
happening in the district courts.”  Fromer, Patentography, supra note 12, at 1496.   
 69.  The rootstock grafts were developed at the University of California, Davis.  See Michael 
Porter, International Perspective on Young Vine Decline, PRACTICAL WINERY & VINEYARD 
JOURNAL, May/June 2001, available at http://www.practicalwinery.com/mayjun01p14.htm.  Many 
historic state patents were for inventions related to agriculture.  See also BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 
92 (cotton), 93 (rice), 99 (wheat, grain).  With thanks to Robert Merges for this hypothetical. 
 70.  Ever since “fracking” was developed, it has been of immense importance to the economies 
of states such as Texas and states that harbor the Marcelus Shale, a deep repository that runs through 
West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York.  Notably, fracking was not an innovation 
independently developed in the private sector but was aided by support from the federal government 
and companies that took a long time to implement fracking due to high cost and risk.  Kevin Begos, 
Fracking Developed with Decades of Government Investment, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/23/fracking-developed-government_n_1907178.html. 
 71.  Generally, the federal government supplies pure “public goods” that are “nonrivalrous” and 
“nonexcludable,” such as national defense.  COOTER, supra note 9, at 105.  However, when public 
goods have a location, such as a bridge or a road, it is often more efficient for local governments to 
provide them.  Id. at 105–06.  See also Sean Sloan, Transportation Finance & the States: Stopgap 
Solutions & Indecision Spell an Uncertain Future, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 538–42 (2010) 
(discussing states’ struggles to fund infrastructure projects).   
 72.  See BERGER, supra note 3, at 216 (discussing clustering of firms in certain locations). 
 73.  See Porter, supra note 8, at 78, 82 (showing a graphic map of clusters). 
 74.  See BERGER, supra note 3, at 216 (discussing the clustering effects produced by 
universities, such as the information technology sector that has grown up around Silicon Valley, or 
the biotechnology sector that thrives off research and brainpower at Harvard and MIT); GLAESER, 
supra note 3, at 29–30 (describing how Stanford helped transform the small agricultural community 
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documented, innovations in advanced countries often rely on a variety of 
resources unique to particular locations, including “immobile assets” like 
coal mines that “are stuck in the ground”; “expert communities with 
intense face-to-face daily exchanges of knowledge”; or “other firms 




Thus, whether an innovation is useful only within a small jurisdiction 
(e.g. the rootstock grafts in Northern California), or is more useful in one 
jurisdiction than in another (e.g. a manufacturing method used by 
automobile manufacturers in Detroit, Michigan), a patent from the state 
could be highly valuable to the owner or licensee, either because use of 
the invention outside the state is unlikely or because use within the state 
is so valuable to others.
76
  Moreover, given the potential import of certain 
innovations in certain areas, states might have incentives to grant patents 
as an impetus to generating and developing locally important innovations 
in the state, just as they did in the pre-Constitution era.
77
 
B.  Innovators Do Not Need Full Internalization of Benefits 
Of course, state patents would not allow patentees to enforce their 
patents or demand license fees outside the state.  They would not enable 
internalization of profits to the same extent as U.S. patents.  But this 
leads to the Goldstein Court’s second observation: the limited 
jurisdiction of state-level protections does not necessarily render an 
exclusive right worthless to the recipient; it merely reduces its economic 
value.
78
  Even though state citizens willing to travel across state lines can 
                                                          
in Santa Clara into a technology hub); id. at 224 (describing how local universities serve as anchors 
for urban economies in Boston, Minneapolis, and Atlanta); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the relationship between universities and patenting). 
 75.  BERGER, supra note 3, at 216. 
 76.  Daniel Kazhdan pointed out to me that the Supreme Court inadvertently recognized the 
existence of innovations of local import in a completely different context.  In a time before the 
establishment of the Federal Circuit, the Court sometimes had to decide whether to review a 
particular patent infringement case even when there was no circuit split.  In deciding to review the 
case anyway, the Court stated that some industries are so concentrated in certain geographical 
locations that patents covering technologies used in those industries were simply unlikely to produce 
litigation in other circuits.  See, e.g., Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., 315 U.S. 
759, 766 (1942) (deciding to review a Seventh Circuit decision respecting a patent on an invention to 
prevent cavitation for water-cooled outboard motors).  
      77. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 (1973). 
 78.  Id. at 558 (“The situation is no different from that which may arise in regard to other state 
monopolies, such as a state lottery, or a food concession in a limited enclosure like a state park; in 
each case, citizens may escape the effect of one State’s monopoly by making purchases in another 
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potentially escape the reach of a state right, exclusivity within the state 
can “still serve to induce new artistic creations within that State—the 
very objective of the grant of protection.”
79
  That is, a state IP right can 
still serve the purpose for which it was designed even if it does not entail 
profits on a national scale. 
This observation is borne out by research suggesting innovators can 
potentially thrive in purely local markets.
80
  It also makes sense from the 
perspective of innovation policy theory.  In their important article, 
Spillovers, Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley explained that the classic 
economics view of a “spillover”—a failure to internalize all the benefits 
of one’s activity that is likely to lead to the decision not to invest in the 
activity—does not apply in the same way when the uncompensated 
feature of a person’s activity is an innovation.  The reason is that 
innovation is uniquely conducive to “productive reuses” and may 
proceed at a more efficient rate in the presence of decentralized use and 
competition.
81
  Thus, its value to society is so much greater than its value 
to the initial creators that allowing creators to fully internalize all the 
benefits of their inventions could actually impede the progress of 
innovation in the long run.  From the perspective of innovation policy, 
this means that: 
[While] we need some ex ante incentive to innovate, we don’t need 
(and don’t particularly want) full internalization of the benefits of an 
invention.  As long as we get enough incentive, the fact that other 
benefits aren’t captured by the innovator doesn’t impose any real cost 
                                                          
area or another State.”). 
 79.  Id. at 558–59.   
 80.  See, e.g., Motoyama et. al., Leveraging Regional Assets: Insights from High-Growth 
Companies in Kansas City, KAUFMAN FOUNDATION, July 2013, at 24 (noting that one-third of the 
entrepreneurs they interviewed provided products and services only in Kansas City or selected 
nearby areas and were still able to achieve scale and growth). 
 81.  Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 14, at 281 (“There is no reason to believe that ownership 
of an idea by any one individual will best encourage that productive reuse.  Innovation is cumulative 
and is generally spurred by decentralized competition.  This is particularly likely to be true of an 
innovation subject to productive reuse, since no one owner can capture the full value of that 
innovation anyway.  If a company can lock up an invention entirely, the company will have 
suboptimal incentives to improve it.  The owner may (or may not) improve on the invention, but no 
one else will be in a position to do so.”) (discussing prior work by Frischmann).  See Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 
872–75 (1990) (noting that a single right holder may underdevelop a given invention’s potential); 
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31–32 (1991) (discussing the potential problems patents pose for cumulative 
innovation).  
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on innovation, and may even contribute to innovation.
82
 
Unlike U.S. patents, state patents do not permit monopolization of 
knowledge at the national level.
83
  To the contrary, by allowing 
innovation spillovers in other states—and even facilitating them in cases 
where states demand highly detailed patent disclosures—state patents 
could provide the right amount of incentive for those innovators who 
choose them over U.S. patents,
84
 while also stimulating productive re-
uses in other states.
85
 
C.  Many Innovations Remain Unprotected by Federal Law 
The Goldstein Court’s final observation, which may be the most 
important when it comes to deciding whether states should still be able to 
grant patents, is that many innovations of potential social utility remain 
unprotected, or insufficiently protected, by federal law.
86
  As Douglas 
Lichtman observed in his article objecting to the Supreme Court’s 
preemption of state patent protections, just because an innovation fails to 
meet U.S. patent law’s standard of patentability, that does not necessarily 
make it undeserving of protection from competition, whether through 
anti-copying laws or through limited periods of exclusivity.
87
  Likewise, 
when an invention is patentable, but a U.S. patent, bounded by federal 
rules regarding subject matter, scope and term length, does not provide 
                                                          
 82.  Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 14, at 276. 
 83.  The Goldstein Court also noted that the failure to allow full internalization could be a 
potential upside rather than a downside of state copyright protections, stating:  
When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no 
citizen or State may escape its reach.  As we have noted, however, the exclusive right 
granted by a State is confined to its borders.  Consequently, even when the right is 
unlimited in duration, any tendency to inhibit further progress in science or the arts is 
narrowly circumscribed.  
412 U.S. at 560–61. 
 84.  As explained in the next part, inventors must choose between U.S. and state patents.  This 
has been the case since 1793. 
 85.  Hrdy, supra note 10, at 91–92. 
 86.  412 U.S. at 558 (“Since the subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may 
thus be of purely local importance and not worthy of national attention or protection, we cannot 
discern such an unyielding national interest as to require an inference that state power to grant 
copyrights has been relinquished to exclusive federal control.”). 
 87.  See Lichtman, supra note 15, at 714.  See generally Arthur R. Miller, Common Law 
Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 705 
(2006) (proposing stronger common law protections for undeveloped ideas that cannot be patented); 
see also Roin, supra note 15, at 564–68 (proposing FDA-administered periods of exclusivity for 
unpatentable drugs). 
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sufficient incentives to actually practice and commercialize it, this does 
not indicate that commercialization of the invention would not be 




In an ideal world no government intervention would be necessary to 
ensure investment in developing and deploying socially valuable 
innovations in the states where they have most value.  But investment in 
innovation is particularly vulnerable to market failure, due both to the 
difficulty of appropriating the value of information in the absence of 
legal protection,
89
 and due to high level of risk involved in investing in 
new technologies or business models.
90
  As scholars like Edmund Kitch 
and Ted Sichelman emphasize, the costs of generating an invention are 
just the beginning of a long road.
91
  The capital required to 
commercialize and develop subsequent improvements can be tremendous 
and require high prospective returns to justify investment.
92
  When the 
risk is too great capital resources run dry, and innovators generally turn 
to private parties such as venture capital firms (VCs) with higher risk 
thresholds and plentiful capital.
93
  But commercially minded VCs may 
require assurances that a technology has a chance to obtain market power 
and earn supernormal returns.
94
  A U.S. patent can make a difference as 
it increases the company’s chances of obtaining market power; but it is 
                                                          
 88.  On underdevelopment of U.S. patents, see Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 
15, at 355–80; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (novelty), 103 (nonobviousness), 112 (specification), 154 
(twenty-year term) (2013). 
 89.  See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 609–25 
(UMI 962) (explaining that the difficulty of valuing and selling information without revealing it 
necessitates some form of legal protection). 
 90.  See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. 
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 373–76 (2000) (discussing innovation market 
failures and types of incentives the federal government provides to correct those market failures). 
 91.  Edmund M. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977).  Like Sichelman, Kitch is cited here for his emphasis on the import of patents for incenting 
commercializing and improving upon inventions, not necessarily for his theory that broad and early 
patents are the best means to achieve this.  See Ted Sichelman, Markets for Patent Scope, 1 IP 
THEORY 42, 44 (2010) (arguing that critiques of Kitch’s theory “mostly ignor[e] Kitch’s concerns 
about commercialization”). 
 92.  See Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, at 354 (contending that just as 
invention “produces information subject to free riding, so does commercialization [and that] the risks 
of commercializing inventions regularly demand supernormal returns to justify taking them”). 
 93.  For discussion and citations to literature on private financing of technological development 
and the VC industry, see Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software 
Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 974–78 (2005). 
 94.  Id. at 976 (explaining that VCs see their goal as “to identify firms that will have sufficient 
market power to earn extraordinary profits”). 
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unlikely to be a decisive factor in deciding to fund a company trying to 




There are at least two specific scenarios in which states might wish 
to supplement federal patent protections for innovation with their own 
patents.  The first scenario is one in which, even if the innovation is 
patentable, the inventor or the reviewing investor decides a U.S. patent 
will not provide sufficient rights of exclusivity to make development 
worthwhile.
96
  Inventors may perceive this reality up front and choose to 
forego patenting in the first place, relying instead on trade secret 
protection or other market advantages; or they may choose to let their 
patents expire without making attempts to develop them.
97
  Here a state 
patent, perhaps with a longer term or a broader scope, could provide an 
alternative form of incentive. 
The second scenario is one in which the innovation is simply not 
patentable.
98
  This includes inventions that have already been disclosed 
or used in other jurisdictions, but that are prohibitively expensive to 
adopt and commercialize in the state.
99
  An example of the second 
scenario comes from a “super high density” olive harvesting technique 
long used in Spain and Italy, but only recently adopted by olive growers 
in California.
100
  Adoption of the technique has contributed to 
                                                          
 95.  Id. at 976–78.  See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent 
Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007) (describing the problem of underdevelopment of 
patented inventions). 
 96.  As Michael Abramowicz puts it, a U.S. patent provides the patentee only with an “option to 
develop and commercialize the patent, but options often turn out to be not worth exercising.”  
Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races Over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 815 
(2007) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Uneasy Case].  
 97.  Notably, about half, probably more, of U.S. patents are never commercially exploited, 
sometimes because they are simply “commercially worthless ab initio” and sometimes because 
development proves too difficult or costly.  See Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, 
at 343; see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade 
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371 (2002) 
(addressing the considerations involved in choosing between patent or trade secret law when the 
subject matter is potentially protectable by either). 
 98.  See Roin, supra note 15, at 503 (observing that a “serious shortcoming” of the drug patent 
system is that “the standards by which drugs are deemed unpatentable under the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements bear little relationship to the social value of those drugs or the need for 
a patent to motivate their development”); see also Lichtman, supra note 15, at 712–14 (concluding 
that laws providing protection for unpatentable innovations “explicitly recognize that their respective 
unpatentable goods can and should be protected, and they implicitly bolster the claim that the same 
might be true for other unpatentable goods”). 
 99.  See Thomas Oakley’s oral argument in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.1, 48 (1824). 
 100.  See Ben Worthen, Family Grows Olives on Industrial Scale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2011, at 
A17C (describing a grower’s decision to adopt new harvesting method). 
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California’s development of a booming olive industry in recent years and 
introduced consumers to new and interesting olive oil blends that would 
not otherwise exist.
101
  But the push to develop a market for high quality 
California olive oils began back in the 1980s and took over thirty years 
to come to fruition due to the expense of adopting and implementing the 
expensive new machinery.
102
  As a consequence, California olive oil 
remained a rarity, even though the state has excellent conditions for 
growing olives and more microclimates in which to produce different 
varieties.
103
  In theory, a state patent on the harvesting technique could 
have been an alternative to foregoing investment and could have 




D.  States’ Non-patent Alternatives 
Without the power to grant patents, states use a variety of non-patent 
incentives to encourage companies to innovate and perform R&D in the 
state.
105
  While grants for early stage research are largely the purview of 
the federal government,
106
 R&D tax incentives, offered by thirty-four 
states as of 2010, have become nearly ubiquitous features of states’ 
development policies.
107
  In theory, R&D tax incentives alleviate the 
                                                          
 101.  See Fran Gage, Bountiful Year for Olive Oil: State’s Largest Harvest Ever Had Producers 
Working Overtime for Weeks, S.F. CHRONICLE, January 13, 2013, at G1.   
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  For the view that patents serve to accelerate rather than simply increase innovation, see, 
e.g. Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 S.J. L. REV. 39, 57–58 
(2006) (“[W]hile virtually every invention would be created sooner or later even without a patent 
system, patents creat[e] incentives for additional research investment, leading to inventions being 
made sooner than they otherwise would be. The patent system creates no inventions, it accelerates 
them.”) 
 105.  For instance, Massachusetts offers a wide variety of incentives designed to promote local 
bioscience companies, including grants for research and R&D tax credits.  See Incentives, 
MASSACHUSETTS BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, 
http://www.massbio.org/economic_development/massachusetts_incentives (last visited Nov.1, 
2013). 
 106.  See Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in 
Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 932 (2009) (“In 2003, state governments accounted for only 5% of 
overall biomedical research funding.”).  On federal grants for research, see Frischmann, supra note 
90, at 387–91; Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 13–14) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245691 (developing “a new taxonomy of 
innovation policies that allows direct comparisons among patents, prizes, grants, and tax 
incentives”). 
 107.  On state R&D tax incentives generally, see RASHKIN, supra note 4, at 263–532.  For a 
 
 
506 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
problem of underinvestment in innovation by encouraging companies to 
spend more on R&D than they would otherwise.
108
  But tax credits are 
very expensive incentives, costing state governments billions of dollars 
in foregone revenues and encouraging companies to invest in innovation 
without requiring any showing of commercial success.
109
 
Patents, in contrast, do not directly divert public funds.  Instead, 
patents “tax” the public in the form of higher prices.
110
  Many argue that 
patents are a more accurate way to determine the appropriate amount for 
this tax than a cash sum selected by the government—particularly when 
the government has little information about the future value of the 
innovation.
111
 Moreover, unlike grants or tax credits, patents give firms 
an added incentive to invest in commercially successful derivations of 
the invention because the reward is “contingent on success”—meaning 
that the patent holder gains nothing from the prospect of an exclusive 
                                                          
comprehensive study of tax credit schemes in New England and studies in other regions, see 
JENNIFER WEINER, NEW ENGLAND PUBLIC POLICY CENTER STATE BUSINESS TAX INCENTIVES: 
EXAMINING EVIDENCE OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 35–42 (2009).  On Michigan’s aggressive tax credit 
scheme circa 2008, see Christopher J. Enge, Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges to the Michigan 
Business Tax, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 333, 340–45 (2010).  See also Enrich, supra note 7, at 
382–85 (discussing harms to states that attempt to offer better incentive structures than other states); 
Brent B. Nicholson & Sue Mota, The Dormant Commerce Clause Rises Again: Cuno v. Daimler 
Chrysler, 5 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 320, 321 (2005) (examining states’ increasing use of location 
incentives, including R&D tax credits).  
 108.  For a detailed discussion of tax credits as innovation incentives, see Frischmann, supra 
note 90, at 382–85 (explaining that, unlike more direct forms of subsidy, tax incentives enhance 
private firms’ incentives to invest in a socially desirable fashion, but “the market remains the 
production engine”); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 106, manuscript at 19–25 (explaining that for 
grants and fixed prizes, the government determines which technologies to fund and how much 
money to allocate to each, whereas with tax credits and patents, private parties generally decide 
which technologies to fund and how much to invest in them).   
 109.  Tax credits cost states millions, even billions, of dollars in foregone tax revenues.  Enrich, 
supra note 7, at 387–89.  See also Frischmann, supra note 90, at 385 (“The social costs of the [tax-
incentive-]enhanced market are a decrease in general revenue and the potential for private risk 
preferences to be more risk-seeking than socially desirable, leading to over-investment in risky 
projects.”).  
 110.  Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 106, manuscript at 7 (arguing that patents impose a 
“shadow tax” on consumers that is not taken into account in budgeting).  See also Dam, supra note 
26, at 249 (discussing general social costs of a monopoly grant).   
 111.  Adam Smith, otherwise opposed to state-sponsored monopolies, believed patents were a 
more accurate and efficient way to value unknown technology than direct rewards.  See ADAM 
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 7.22 (2009) (discussing early gold trades with kings for patent rights); 
see also Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 70 (2002) (“IP is probably the best mechanism for 
screening projects when value and cost are not observable by the sponsor, since the private value of 
IP reflects the social value, and firms automatically compare some measure of value with the cost of 
innovation.  In addition, IP encourages firms to accelerate progress, since the reward is conditional 
on success.”). 
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right on a useless technology, but experiences substantial gain if the 
technology is a commercial success.
112
 
From state and local governments’ perspectives, at least, patents 
have another benefit over direct cash payments: they are politically cheap 
incentives.
113
  Many pundits object to government subsidies for local 
projects, contending that government should not risk losing taxpayers’ 
money on new technologies of unproven value or attempt to intervene in 
the market by “picking winners.”
114
  This objection recently found a 
rallying cry in the public failure of the solar firm Solyndra, which 
received federal loans before going bankrupt, thus exposing the Obama 
administration to claims that it failed to properly evaluate the company 
before granting the loans.
115
  States, which have less money to spend, are 
even more vulnerable to public scorn for “saddling taxpayers with 
stinkers.”
116
  Therefore, even if we believe government can and should 
                                                          
 112.  See Frischmann, supra note 90, at 377 (discussing private market benefits).  See also 
Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 111, at 55 (arguing that private firms will avoid fruitless endeavors 
because the market only demands useful innovations).  Notably, prizes can theoretically be made 
contingent on market success.  See, e.g., Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the 
Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
123, 130–36 (1997) (noting that prizes could be determined by referring to a company’s sales). 
 113.  As noted below, some social welfare scholars have characterized the ease of granting 
patents as a downside due to the potential that politicians will grant useless rights to gain political 
favor.  For an explanation of the influence of political economy on the decision whether to use IP or 
direct payments to support innovation, see Robert P. Merges, The Economic Impact of Intellectual 
Property Rights: An Overview and Guide, 19 J. CULTURAL ECON. 103, 110–11 (1995) [hereinafter 
Economic Impact of Intellectual Property Rights] (outlining potential risks and benefits from 
political influence affecting intellectual property rights).  See also Michael W. Carroll, One Size 
Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 
1431–32 (2009) (arguing for a more diverse approach to IP rights).   
 114.  With direct grants for research, “the government . . . often bears the entire downside risk of 
an unsuccessful project.”  Frischmann, supra note 90, at 387.  See also Bailey Kuklin, The Gaps 
Between the Fingers of the Invisible Hand, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 837–38 (1992) (summarizing 
concerns about the cost of government intervention).   
 115.  For some objections from modern economists and policy makers to government “picking 
winners,” see Diane Cardwell, Energy Tax Breaks Proposed, Despite Waning Support for Subsidies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/business/energy-
environment/clean-energy-projects-face-waning-subsidies.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (pointing 
out that alternative energy industries were favored by congress but defaulted on “more than half a 
billion dollars” worth of federal loans). 
 116.  For instance, Delaware recently provided $21.5 million in taxpayer money to Fisker 
Automotive, an electric car company that promised to open a plant in the state.  The company failed 
to meet deadlines and is now in dire financial straits.  “All we want are the jobs or our money back,” 
said the head of Delaware’s economic development office.  Op-Ed., Silicon Valley’s Green Energy 
Mistake, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323401904578159660625274422.  See also 
Bill Vlasic, Breaking Down on the Road to Electric Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/business/fisker-broke-down-on-the-road-to-electric-
cars.html?pagewanted=all (noting that “millions of dollars in government loans” and private 
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spend public money to promote welfare-enhancing innovations, state 
policymakers may be wary due to the high political cost. 
The obvious objection to this point is that the comparatively low 
political cost of granting patents will lead to unnecessary, over-rewarding 
patents based on legislative whim or the influence of well-organized 
lobbyists.  As Robert Merges has repeatedly pointed out, one of the 
unique characteristics of legally granted monopolies is that they are a 
cheap and easy way for politicians to reward their friends.
117
  Patents 
involve no direct expenditure of government funds and represent 
“something of a free lunch in the eyes of government: a valuable benefit 
for which business constituents will be grateful, but which also has a 
zero impact on the federal budget deficit.”
118
  This is one reason Merges 
and other scholars generally object to post hoc patent rewards granted by 
legislators.
119
   
But there are ways to reduce the political economy risks generated 
by state patents, including requiring policymakers to carefully record the 
patent review and granting process—as they often do for other kinds of 
innovation awards—and to include patent costs in budget disclosures.
120
  
Judicial review of patent grants, which is discussed in depth in Part V.D, 
can also play a very important role in limiting the negative effects of the 
various problems endemic to a legislative patent system.  Moreover, it is 
important to note that tax credits—because they are paid for by foregone 
revenues rather than direct cash outlays—also impose a delayed tax and 
may be equally vulnerable to the temptation of political gifts.
121
 
                                                          
investments were wasted on an electric car company that eventually filed for bankruptcy). 
 117.  See, e.g., Merges, supra note 113, at 111 (noting that intellectual property rights are “a 
valuable benefit for which business constituents will be grateful”).  This issue is also addressed 
below in the discussion of state patents’ “local utility” requirement.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 118.  Merges, supra note 113, at 111. 
 119.  See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the 
Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 57–60 (2000) (explaining that a “post hoc 
reward, granted on the basis of legislative whim or influence” is not likely to “encourage[] authors, 
inventors, and investors, to take risks . . . with the expectation of reaping profits later”); Dam, supra 
note 26, at 249 (noting the potential for pork barrel features of a legislative approach to patents). 
 120.  Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 106, manuscript at 59–61 (discussing the risks of a patent 
system that takes “shadow taxes” from the public without revealing those taxes in budget figures and 
arguing that, in order to encourage elected officials to take into account the actual cost of patents on 
consumers, budget figures should include shadow taxes). 
 121.  Tax breaks usually do not involve direct cash outlays like direct subsidies or grants, and are 
instead “paid for” in tax revenue losses.  See WEINER, supra note 107, at 5–6 (providing the dollar 
amount of tax revenues “spent” on tax incentives in East Coast states).  Thus, policymakers may 
grant them more liberally and be more susceptible to lobbying and rent-seeking than they would if 
they were required to account for the expenditure.  Daniel Coenen and others theorize that this may 
be why courts are more likely to uphold subsidies than tax incentives in dormant Commerce Clause 
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Scholars hotly debate the efficacy of non-patent incentives versus 
patent incentives.
122
  It may not be the case that state patent incentives 
are always superior to grants, prizes, or tax credits for incenting 
investment in innovations—but certainly a healthy mix of patent and 
non-patent incentives may be the best medicine for a grounded 
innovation policy.
123
  Indeed, historically, patents were only one of many 
business incentives that states and colonies used to promote development 
of risky new technologies.
124
  At present, states do not grant any patents.  
To correct this imbalance, states should be able to grant patents in cases 
where the state reasonably believes patents would work better than non-
patent options or would effectively supplement those other options. 
IV. REINTRODUCING STATE PATENTS 
Having now explained why states, if not the federal government, 
may have strong incentives to use exclusive rights to promote investment 
in certain innovations, and why those rights might prove valuable to 
innovators and the communities they inhabit, the next hurdle is to explain 
how this business incentive would work in practice.  In his proposal for 
state-level protections, Douglas Lichtman limited states to passing anti-
copying laws to protect local industries that are vulnerable to particularly 
cheap and effective modes of copying.
125
  However, the premise of this 
Part is that states should go further by granting their own patents: 
statutory rights that provide limited-in-time rights of exclusivity over an 
innovation within the state’s jurisdiction, regardless of whether the 
innovation is patentable at the federal level.  Similar to federal patents, 
                                                          
decisions.  See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE 
L.J. 965, 1032–35 (1998) (discussing competing state subsidies and potential effects). But see Hemel 
& Ouellette, supra note 106 (noting that it “seems clear that the costs that appear on the federal 
budget” from patents are far smaller than those from other incentives).  
 122.  See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual 
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 1023 (2012) (arguing that the U.S. government relies 
too heavily on IP incentives).  
 123.  See Frischmann, supra note 90, at 349–50 (noting that intellectual property rights are not 
necessarily the best tool for promoting innovation and should be mixed with other mechanism of 
promotion).  See also Carroll, supra note 113, at 1410–13 (arguing that subsidies should be used 
along with intellectual property rights to promote innovation); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 106 
(arguing that which incentive to adopt depends on a range of factors including the government’s 
ability to evaluate projects, risk aversion of inventors, efficiency of capital markets, deadweight 
losses resulting from taxation and monopoly, administrative costs, political economy considerations, 
and distributive justice considerations). 
 124.  Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 99. 
 125.  See discussion of Lichtman’s work in Part V.C, infra. 
 
510 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
the general purpose of state patent rights would be to provide an ex post 
reward and ex ante incentive for the innovator to expend effort in 
deriving, developing, or marketing the innovation in the state.  State 
patents could also act as a useful “signal” for investors, potentially 
causing them to invest in a company’s technology, thereby helping 
innovators in emerging fields obtain access to private funding.
126
 
As mentioned in the introduction, intergovernmental experimentation 
in designing state patent laws provides value, and state patents should not 
be restricted to a particular format; however, following historical 
precedent also provides value.  Not only did the patents granted by states 
and colonies retain a protected status under the IP Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment,
127
 but they were in use for over two hundred years and may 
have played a role in promoting innovation in America.
128
  Therefore, 
this section proposes an idealized version of modern state patents largely 
based on their historic counterparts.  As discussed above, state patents 
were historically granted in individual statutes by the legislatures.
129
  
Besides their limited jurisdiction, four features distinguished them from 
U.S. patents: (1) local utility requirements, (2) flexible standards of 
patentability, (3) local working requirements, and (4) tailored scopes and 
term lengths.  Below is an explanation of how each of these four features 
would work in a concurrent system of patent protection and how they 
would contribute to the dual goals of promoting innovation and local 
economic development.  Finally, the Article presents a hypothetical state 
patent for horizontal drilling technology in North Dakota. 
                                                          
 126.  The primary utilitarian justifications for patents are the incentive-to-invent and incentive-
to-disclose theories.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights 
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1989).  The incentive-to-innovate and 
prospect theory justifications add that the chance of obtaining a limited patent monopoly will entice 
patent holders to invest still more time and capital, after an invention has been made, to develop, 
perfect, and market it to the public.  See id. at 1036–45 (explaining Joseph Schumpeter’s and 
Edmund Kitch’s famous theories).  In today’s world of high financing, U.S. patents also may serve 
as a useful signal for capital-rich investors that a particular innovation or company is a good 
investment.  Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 653 (2002). 
 127.  See Hrdy, State Patents in the Age of Laissez Faire, supra note 32, at 70–74 (detailing the 
evidence that states retained patent-granting rights).  
 128.  See id. at 104–08 (discussing New York’s steamboat patent as market-corrective). 
 129.  Today, states could grant patents by individual statutes, they could grant patents by 
utilizing state agencies that would review patents and recommend them to the legislature, or state 
agencies could issue patents directly under delegated authority.  State agencies could also grant 
patents by applying a framing statute crafted by the legislature, as the PTO does under the U.S. 
Patent Act. 
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A. Local Utility Requirement 
The most controversial feature of state patents is likely to be that 
they have a local utility requirement.  This means that the applicant for a 
state patent must detail specific benefits that his or her innovation will 
bring to the state.
130
  As Oren Bracha described it, historically, 
[t]he usual procedure involved a petition of the would be grantee to the 
assembly detailing his invention as well as the particular benefits it had 
to offer to the public and praying exclusivity privileges.  In a fashion 
similar to the early English grants[,] applicants usually detailed specific 
tangible benefits offered by their inventions such as lower prices, the 
supply of a scarce commodity or the saving of labor.
131
 
To satisfy the local utility requirement today, we can imagine that 
the putative benefits of a proposed innovation could be wide-ranging.  
An innovator could cite, for instance, higher profits in a local industry 
and more jobs for local workers or enhanced standards of living for state 
citizens.  Ideally, states would use the local utility requirement to direct 
patents at technologies that promote long-term social goals, but where 
firms lack sufficient incentives to develop and bring new innovations to 
the market.
132
  An example is the alternative energy field, where new 
means of producing energy are difficult to promote alongside cheaper 
alternatives like coal and natural gas.
133
  Hypothetical subject matter for 
state patents includes the solar-powered electric car-charging stations 
that the government recently installed in St. Paul, Minnesota;
134
 the 
“artificial leaves” under development with federal funding in Berkeley, 
California (which convert sunlight, carbon dioxide, and water into 
chemical fuel using a process similar to photosynthesis);
135
 a “power 
                                                          
 130.  See supra Part II.B.  
 131.  Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 100. 
 132.  As Tim Wu explains, “the need to provide incentives for product investments depends 
strongly on the availability of returns from the market.  The stronger the market returns, the less 
government encouragement in the form of intellectual property rights is needed. . . . [In contrast, 
when the] returns from the market are weak . . . [t]he case for strong intellectual property rights is at 
its zenith.”  Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 123, 146–47 (2006).  
 133. See Mohamed T. El-Ashry, National Policies to Promote Renewable Energy, 141 
DAEDALUS 105, 109 (2012) (describing types of policies city and local governments typically use to 
promote investment in renewable energy, including tax credits, grants, and direct cash subsidies). 
 134. See Joe Kimball, How Do Those Solar-Power Electric-Car Chargers in St. Paul Work?, 
MINN. POST, Apr. 13, 2012, http://www.minnpost.com/two-cities/2012/04/how-do-those-solar-
power-electric-car-chargers-st-paul-work.  With thanks to Robert Merges for this hypothetical. 
 135. See James Temple, Turning Over New Leaf in Climate Change, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 12, 
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buoy” for capturing energy from waves under development off the coast 
of Oregon;
136
 or the advanced methods for reclaiming wastewater that 
coastal cities in California and Florida are attempting to implement as 
supplemental water sources.
137
  Any of these innovations, if successful, 
could prove a valuable addition to a state’s economy and raise residents’ 
standards of living. 
A local utility requirement comports with the Goldstein Court’s 
notion that states should retain authority to use exclusive rights to 
promote technologies that the state deems of particular “local 
importance.”
138
  But a local utility requirement cuts against the modern 
notion that patent law is normally “not the proper place to conduct 
technology assessment.”
139
  As Michael Abramowicz put it, with respect 
to the possibility of government-administered “patent auctions,” even if 
we could be sure that there are technologies—or even entire 
technological fields—in which patents would be efficient, “the question 
remains whether the government could do a good enough job in 
identifying the relevant fields.”
140
   
Another problem is political economy.  Nineteenth century 
proponents of historic state patent laws often argued that state legislators, 
unlike royal monarchs, are elected representatives of the people who—it 
is assumed—act for the public good.
141
  Today, we might be less willing 
to believe that state legislators act in the best interests of the public at all 
times.  Politicians might rather stay in office than promote innovation 
                                                          
2013, http://www.sfgate.com/science/article/Turning-over-new-leaf-in-climate-change-4189890.php. 
 136. See Kirk Johnson, Project Aims to Harness the Power of Waves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/us/project-aims-to-harness-wave-energy-off-the-oregon-
coast.html.   
 137. On attempts to supplement traditional sources of water with reclaimed wastewater in some 
coastal cities, see Felicity Barringer, As ‘Yuck Factor’ Subsides, Treated Wastewater Flows From 
Taps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/science/earth/despite-yuck-
factor-treated-wastewater-used-for-drinking.html?pagewanted=all.  Some California cities are 
attempting to implement desalinization techniques, which are even more costly, using financing 
measures like bond offerings and equity investments.  See Felicity Barringer, In California, What 
Price Water?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/business/energy-
environment/a-costly-california-desalination-plant-bets-on-future-affordability.html.  
 138. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 (1973).  
 139. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and 
Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067–68 (1988). See also Mark A. Lemley, The 
Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 109 (2013) (arguing against a system in 
which those entering the market must seek government permission because such a system permits 
the government to “decide the course of innovation”).  
 140. Abramowicz, Uneasy Case, supra note 96, at 835.    
 141. See Commodification of Patents, supra note 28, at 243 (explaining that state patents were a 
function of both discretion and the “legitimacy of the governmental assertion attached”).  
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and long-term social welfare.
142
  They might be inclined to grant patents 
for so-called “innovations” that benefit voters’ short-term interests, such 
as patents on technologies that increase, rather than decrease, the need 
for human labor.  Politicians might also be subject to lobbying and rent 
seeking by powerful interest groups promising political support in 
exchange for patents.
143
  Thus, relying solely on politicians to decide 
when to deny and grant patents could reduce rather than increase 
investment in innovation.  After all, the saying goes, “if horses could 
have voted, there never would have been cars.”
144
 
An initial response to the “anti-regulatory” critique is that the states 
already selectively subsidize innovations that have become “political 
projects”; they just use non-patent incentives like tax credits to 
accomplish this goal.
145
  A second response is that concerns about 
government intervention in the process of innovation are largely 
misplaced in this context.  U.S. patent law—like the patent laws of most 
developed countries—already offers patents on a relatively technology-
neutral basis; and state patents can never replace U.S. patents because of 
their limited jurisdictions.
146
  This has two important implications.  First, 
the effects on overall investment in technological development would 
likely be minimal, since few would choose state patents over U.S. 
patents.  Second, the major costs generally associated with using patents 
to subsidize selected innovations—namely, blocking or delaying 
competitive entry, over-centralizing decision-making, and hindering 
future innovation in the industry
147
—simply do not apply with equal 
                                                          
 142. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 311 (2007) (discussing political 
economy issues in innovation policy); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS 
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 183–84 (2012) (explaining that 
innovators often face resistance from “powerful rulers and elites”).  
 143. Robert Merges has continually stressed this feature of legislative monopolies.  See, e.g., 
Merges, supra note 113, at 110 (noting that IP rights benefit only those groups who receive them).  
See also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 142, at 311 (noting that those groups promoting narrow 
interests may have “a significant advantage in judicial proceedings”); ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, 
supra note 142, at 187–88 (explaining the English Crown’s practice of granting numerous 
monopolies that “impeded the type of allocation of talent, which is so crucial to economic 
prosperity”). 
 144. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Average is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/opinion/friedman-average-is-
over.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1379696067-czX44SSfU1o6wsVPs+LrMQ (arguing that U.S. 
workers of average skill level are being replaced by foreign labor and labor-saving technology). 
 145. See supra Part III.D.   
 146. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560–61 (1973) (“[T]he exclusive right granted by a 
State is confined to its borders.”).   
 147. Wu, supra note 132, at 134; See Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 14, at 283 (noting in 
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force to state patents because other innovators remain free to compete 
and experiment with the invention in other states and to work further on 
the general problem it is trying to solve.
148
  Therefore, even when state 
patents affect the course of innovation in a particular field or technology, 
they do not create the same kinds of innovation-halting monopolies we 
worry about in the context of national patents.
149
 
B.  Flexible Standards of Patentability 
The second distinct historic feature of state and colonial patents was 
that they were granted based on flexible standards of patentability.  
Unlike U.S. patent law, state and colonial patent laws did not require 
inventors to meet predetermined criteria of patentability like novelty or 
nonobviousness.
150
  As explained in Part II, these early patents did not 
necessarily seek to promote production and disclosure of entirely new 
information.  Ever since 1790, this has been purely the domain of the 
federal government.
151
  Instead, historical state and colonial patents 
primarily focused on whether a local patent would lead to successful 
introduction of technology that benefited the local community.
152
  This is 
the role state patents would ideally play today.  In granting patents, state 
governments should be less concerned about whether particular subject 
matter is new, let alone “nonobvious.”  Instead, they should focus on 




A more relaxed novelty standard cuts against the modern assumption 
that a primary purpose of intellectual property law is to generate 
incentives for the disclosure of new information.
154
 The Supreme Court 
                                                          
particular the danger of removing incentives to invent). 
 148. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 81, at 872–75 (1990).  
 149. See Wu, supra note 132, at 134 (describing one of the chief costs of IP law as preventing 
market entry of potential innovators). 
 150. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006).  
 151. See Biagioli, supra note 33, at 1138–39 (explaining U.S. Patent Act’s new and unique focus 
on information disclosure).   
 152. See id. at 1138 (explaining the requirement of reduction to practice).   
 153.  See Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, at 404 (advocating relaxed 
novelty standards for commercialization patents).  See also Lichtman, supra note 15, at 714–15 
(noting that states may play an important role in protecting unpatentable innovations). 
 154. See Kapczynski, supra note 122, at 981 (explaining that IP scholarship currently focuses on 
the information benefits of IP law).  Patents’ efficacy in promoting disclosure is debated. See, e.g., 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 
549 (2012) (arguing that patent disclosures provide many benefits).  
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has remarked that the information disclosed in a patent is “of such 
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to 
pay the high price of 17 [now twenty] years of exclusive use for its 
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the 
eventual development of further significant advances in the art.”
155
  
However, conceiving of the patent as a contract in which new 
information is disclosed in exchange for the high price of an exclusive 
right is a relatively modern development.
156
  The state patent is a 
different kind of contract entirely: the patentee accepts an exclusive right 
in exchange for agreeing to develop and deploy an innovation that would 
not otherwise exist in the state.  So long as state patents do not interfere 
with U.S. patent law’s own goal of disclosure, the two incentives can 
exist side by side.
157
 
If absolute novelty and informational disclosure are not the main 
considerations of state patents, what standard of patentability should 
states employ to promote local working?  States could build loosely off 
Michael Abramowicz’s and John Duffy’s suggestion, itself based on the 
Supreme Court’s insight in Graham v. John Deere: that patents should be 
granted based on an “inducement standard” of patentability, which 
restricts the award of a patent to those inventions which “would not have 
been disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”
158
  
Although state governments need not apply precisely the same economic 
analysis that Abramowicz and Duffy recommend, at the most general 
level, the decision to grant a state patent should take into account both 
the legislature’s assessment of the need for the patent and the likely 
benefits to the public from granting an exclusive right—what Oren 
Bracha called a “specific calculus of the public good.”
159
 
The analysis would have to be altered in two foundational respects.  
First, Abramowicz and Duffy assume federal courts will perform the 
patentability analysis after patents are challenged in litigation and that 
the government will not play a direct role in selecting which technologies 
                                                          
 155. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).  
 156. For instance, Vivian Fong argues that the Framers’ original economic justification for U.S. 
patents was to encourage the “influx of technology” into regions throughout the country; it had less 
to do with promoting the spread of new information.  Vivian J. Fong, Are We Making Progress?: 
The Constitution as a Touchstone for Creating Consistent Patent Law and Policy, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1163, 1165 (2009). 
 157. See infra Part V.C (discussing preemption and potential conflicts). 
 158. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 
YALE L.J. 1590, 1593–94, 1625 (2011) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966)).   
 159. Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 101. 
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meet the inducement standard before granting the patent.
160
  Second, 
Abramowicz and Duffy conceive of patents as incentives to induce 
universally novel inventions, whereas states might grant patents for 
inventions already known, to some extent, in other jurisdictions.
161
  
Building on these distinctions, states could start with a revised version of 
Abramowicz and Duffy’s inducement standard that restricts state patents 
to cases where the innovation would not be developed and practiced in 
the state but for the inducement effects of the patent.
162
  In considering 
whether a state patent is justified, the state should consider the incentives 
that would exist without the state patent—including the availability of 
other incentives like U.S. patents, tax credits, or private funding—and 
the expected economic costs of generating, developing, and successfully 
working the invention in the state.
163
 
C.  Local Working Requirements 
The third defining feature of state patents is the local working 
requirement.  The purpose of the local working requirement is two-fold.  
First, it requires the patent holder to provide consideration in exchange 
for the patent by deploying the patented innovation in the state.
164
  
Second, it generates a timeline in which this must be completed.
165
  
States can mandate local working in various ways.  States can insert an 
explicit local working clause enumerating that the patent is contingent on 
the holder successfully developing and practicing the patented invention 
within the state and within a set timeframe.
166
  States could also promote 
                                                          
 160. On the potential pitfalls of this approach, see DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE 
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 104–07 (2009); infra Part IV.D (explaining 
tailored patent incentives and objections to this approach).  
 161. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 158, at 1593.  See also Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 
99 (explaining the concept of “invention” employed in the colonies was that of the introduction of a 
new trade or industry). 
 162. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 158, at 1590, 1625 (arguing that the inducement 
standard should serve as the “doctrinal polestar” in part because it is supported by Supreme Court 
precedent and it provides “compelling economic justification” for both granting and denying 
patents).  
 163. Id. at 1625–26. 
 164.  See supra Part II.B (explaining local working requirements in historical state and colonial 
patents).  
 165.  Id.   
 166.  This is similar to the working requirement Ted Sichelman recommends for 
commercialization patents: “The working requirement is straightforward: commercialize the 
invention or lose the patent.”  Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, at 402 
(recommending a timeline for working of “perhaps three years from filing (adjusted for regulatory 
delay)”).  However, state patents would likely require local working within the granting state. Such 
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local development by inserting set infringement penalties into the 
patents.
167
  This ensures that if the state patent holder fails to successfully 
develop the innovation in the state, then others can attempt to do so in 
exchange for a reasonable royalty; and penalties prevent successful 
patent holders from demanding excessive royalty rates and raising prices 
beyond what consumers can afford. 
State patents’ emphasis on local working resembles that of some 
developing nations; these nations may use local working requirements 
and compulsory licensing to ensure that new technologies enter local 
markets and benefit local industries.
168
  But today the U.S. Patent Act 
imposes no working requirement,
169
 and, as discussed below in Part 
V.A., international treaties restrict developed nations’ ability to use 
working requirements in their patent laws.
170
  A major reason is the 
conception that the goal of patent law is to encourage ex ante 
investments in deriving a patentable invention, and that no further 
incentive is needed to ensure that patent holders make “further 
investment in the improvement, maintenance, or commercialization of 
the product.”
171
  If the invention has value at all, the argument goes, then 
it will eventually reach markets where it is most valued.
172
  Another 
reason is apparently a concern that mandating working of patented 
inventions will reduce inventors’ incentives to obtain patents, and thus 
disclose valuable new information to the public, due to a fear that they 
will be unable to successfully commercialize the invention.
173
 
However, neither of these concerns has much relevance to state 
patents, whose primary goal is precisely to encourage local working of 
technology in the state in which the patent is granted.  If we believe 
                                                          
is the case with most current R&D credits.  RASHKIN, supra note 4, at 265. 
 167.   For a list cataloguing a wide variety of infringement penalties, see BUGBEE, supra note 31, 
at 61–103.   
 168.  See Fong, supra note 156, at 1185–87 (discussing the compulsory license system formerly 
used by India).   
 169.  See supra Part II.A.  Congress has, though, used compulsory licensing in certain 
circumstances.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (creating cover license for copyrighted music).   
 170.  See Fong, supra note 156, at 1186–87 (citing the lack of a working requirement in many 
developed nations). 
 171.  Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 130 (2004).   
 172.  Lemley, supra note 139, at 130–36 (arguing that commercialization of successfully 
patented products will occur without government intervention).  But see Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, at 359–60 (critiquing Lemley’s argument on the grounds 
that Lemley ignores the further investments required to market patented inventions).   
 173.  See Fong, supra note 156, at 1186 (citing this fear, although providing statistics that 
suggest the opposite may be true).   
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inventions will automatically be implemented wherever they have the 
most value, then neither local working requirements nor state patents are 
necessary incentives.  Those suspicious of market incentives will find the 
local working requirement crucial: the requirement not only creates a 
legal mandate to deploy the invention in the state, it also lets the state 
control the timeline in which development will occur.  The second 
concern—that mandating local working will reduce inventors’ incentives 
to disclose their new inventions due to a fear that they cannot 
successfully work the technology in the state—is largely inapplicable.  If 
a state patent’s local working requirement leads inventors of patentable 
inventions to refrain from patenting at the state level, then they already 
have the option and the incentive to obtain U.S. patents instead and 
disclose their invention in specifications as required by the U.S. Patent 
Act, which has no working requirement.
174
 
D.  Tailored Patent Incentives 
The final historic attribute of state patents was that their lengths, 
scopes, and terms were tailored to coincide with the time, expense, and 
risk the patentee was likely to incur in developing and implementing a 
particular technology in the state.
175
  This contrasts significantly with 
U.S. patents, which are not tailored in scope and have identical terms.  
Besides history, there is no inherent reason why state patents today must 
be tailored.  States could simply adopt their own twenty-year patents or 
even return to the historic fourteen-year term.
176
  Yet, it might be better 
policy for states to tailor patents to the technology and industry involved.  
Scholars have identified significant costs associated with uniform “one-
size-fits-all” patents.
177
  These costs include, on the one hand, 
deadweight loss that results when patents “overprice” information goods 
or are granted for inventions that would have been developed in the 
absence of patent protection;
178
 and, on the other hand, insufficient 
                                                          
 174.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (requiring only a description of the invention). 
 175.  The character of state patents varied immensely both within states and also between states.  
See BUGBEE, supra note 31, 57–83 (discussing patents granted by early colonial governments for 
items such as soap, cigarettes, and salt); id. at 84–103 (discussing state approaches to patents during 
1790s).  See also Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 100–01 (describing case-specific nature of 
colonial and state patents). 
 176.  Notably, in the 1780s, states began to settle on fourteen-year periods, presumably following 
the British practice.  BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 93. 
 177.  See Carroll, supra note 113, at 1364 (describing problem of uniformity cost in IP rights). 
 178.  On deadweight loss, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
115, 128–30 (2003) (arguing substantial economic loss results from delaying issuance of patents). 
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incentives to invest in developing innovations that are particularly 
difficult or time-consuming to commercialize following invention.
179
  
Thus, tailoring state patents, if tailoring could be done accurately and 
efficiently, would be objectively superior to one-size-fits-all rights.
180
 
Current scholarship on patent tailoring raises an important objection, 
however.  Although they have been active proponents for tailoring U.S. 
patent law to the needs of different industries, Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley contend that the task is best left to federal courts.
181
  They argue 
it would be undesirable for Congress to tailor patent rules due to 
inadequate information, the difficulty of differentiating among industries 
and technologies, administrative costs, and the risk of special interest 
lobbying.
182
  Burk and Lemley also suggest industry-specific rules might 
violate the international patent standards laid out in TRIPS.
183
  However, 
these objections do not undermine the proposal that states should tailor 
state patent incentives. 
First, as explained below, state patents do not violate TRIPS.  
Second, many scholars do not share Burk and Lemley’s concerns about 
patent tailoring, even with respect to federal patents.
184
  Indeed, as 
previously discussed, various scholars have recommended that Congress 
implement alternative forms of U.S. patents.
185
  Third, Burk and 
Lemley’s major concern is that “a unitary, unvarying, and monolithic 
statute” would be unable to “supply the correct level of incentive to so 
many diverse industries with divergent incentives” and would become 
                                                          
 179.  See Abramowicz, supra note 95, at 1097 (discussing difficulty of too little patent in the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 180.  See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 160, at 105; Carroll, supra note 113, at 1421.  On 
tailoring patent term lengths, see Eric Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 271 (2006) (arguing grant of varied patent durations based on 
particular industry reduces monopoly risks and creates flexibility). 
 181.  BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 160, at 5, 97–100, 106–07. 
 182.  See id. at 97–100, 106–07 (examining problems created by Congress during early 2000s).  
See also, e.g., Merges supra note 113, at 111 (discussing interest group and political influence 
concerns); Roin, supra note 15, at 559 (noting that it would be difficult for Congress to carefully and 
narrowly tailor special patent rights for otherwise unpatentable drugs); Carroll, supra note 113, at 
1399 (suggesting policymakers may “lack an evidentiary basis” for tailoring IP rights). 
 183.  Burk and Lemley suggest that TRIPS would prohibit tailoring patents to the needs of 
particular technologies, though concede that Article 8 makes significant exceptions. BURK & 
LEMLEY, supra note 160, at 97.  
 184.  See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 160, at 96 (noting a variety of proposals for tailoring U.S. 
patents to technologies and industries and proposals for sui generis protection). 
 185.  See, e.g., Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, at 408–09 (discussing a 
commercialization patent system); Johnson, supra note 180, at 271 (discussing several alternative 
regimes).   
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obsolete in a short period of time.
186
  But this concern does not apply to 
those state patents that are granted in individual statutes and tailored to 
the needs of individual innovators.  Moreover, state governments, 
because they are autonomous decentralized regimes, may have a unique 
advantage for perfecting the practice of patent tailoring.  State 
governments operate at the regional rather than the national level.  Thus, 
states would likely be designing state patents for specific clusters of 
technologies and industries, and could develop expertise in those 
areas.
187
  Unlike Congress, states would not be wedded to a single 
centralized patent policy and could experiment and remain flexible in 
designing patents that function best in their own jurisdictions.  For all 
these reasons, states might have a unique opportunity to design patents 
that better approximate incentives required to innovate. 
E. A Hypothetical State Patent 
An example best illustrates how state patents would work in practice.  
Imagine it is 1985.  North Dakota, whose small oil industry supported the 
state’s economy during the 1970s and early 1980s, is experiencing an 
economic decline as the state’s supply of drillable oil dries up and fewer 
drilling rigs are built in the state.
188
  The North Dakota legislature has 
just learned about new drilling techniques, including horizontal well 
drilling and hydraulic fracking.  These new drilling techniques, if 
successfully developed, could allow drilling rigs to extract oil from the 
Bakken Formation, a unique group of oil-rich rocks located in the 
state.
189
  The state begins offering state patents for qualifying 
technologies related to extraction of oil from underground geological 
formations. 
A company called Meridian Oil,
190
 whose engineers have been 
                                                          
 186.  BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 160, at 105. 
 187.  See Fromer, Patentography, supra note 12, at 1482 (arguing that clustering of patent cases 
in particular districts could help courts develop industry- and technology-specific rules).   
 188.  In reality, the North Dakota oil industry’s decline lasted nearly a quarter century until 
approximately 2005, when horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking techniques became 
economically feasible on the Bakken.  See Chris Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Feb. 3, 2013, at 29. 
 189.  See id. (“The Bakken Formation now accounts for 91 percent of North Dakota’s oil 
production.”). 
 190.  Meridian Oil was the company that spudded the first horizontal well in North Dakota in 
1987, long before the current boom.  Id.  See also Julie Lefebvre, Oil Production from the Bakken 
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researching horizontal drilling techniques, applies for a North Dakota 
patent.  Meridian provides a specification laying out a proposed method 
for horizontal drilling including related machinery, and a business plan 
including a detailed development timeframe.  Neither the techniques nor 
the various machinery Meridian proposes are entirely new, and Meridian 
would not qualify for a U.S. Patent of any significant scope.
191
  
Nonetheless, hoping to encourage Meridian to test and develop this 
technology on the Bakken Formation, the legislature grants the company 
a twenty-one year patent.  The patent has a local working clause that 
requires successful development in the state within two years, subject to 
extensions.  The patent also has a compulsory licensing provision that 
will be triggered following three years of profitable commercial use, 
assuming competitors seek to use Meridian’s technology in the state. 
Meridian agrees to the patent’s terms and begins to invest in the 
project and raise money from outside investors, who see Meridian’s state 
patent as a sign that the company will prevail and hope to share the 
profits.
192
  In 1987, after a near-success, Meridian receives an extension 
on its local working clause.  By 1990, Meridian has made its technology 
cost-efficient and relatively safe, and Meridian starts earning profit from 
oil sales and licensing fees to other oil companies like Exxon that also 
start drilling in the state.  North Dakota’s economy benefits immensely 
from new jobs and more taxable revenues.  North Dakota spends excess 
revenues on improving education and infrastructure.  By 2005, North 
Dakota’s patent is considered an economic success and has improved the 
overall quality of life in the state. 
V. LIMITS ON STATE PATENTS 
Having made the case for introducing state patents as a new 
innovation incentive, this Article must now address the legal barriers to 
implementing state patents—the four sources of law that might limit 
states’ authority to grant patents.  Then, it outlines a new three-part 
approach that relies on the dormant Commerce Clause—not patent 
preemption—to better address the risks raised by state patents. 
                                                          
Meridian Oil’s pivotal role in drilling in Bakken Formation). 
 191.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2013) (requiring subject matter to be novel and nonobvious, a 
requirement Meridian’s drills could not meet). 
 192.  See Long, supra note 126, at 653 (arguing that patents can provide “signals” to investors to 
invest in a company). 
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A. TRIPS 
State patents may diverge from some of the patent standards laid out 
in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) for member nations of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).
193
  With several important exceptions,
194
 TRIPS requires that 
patents be made “available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application[,]”
195
 and last a 
minimum of twenty years from the filing date.
196
  TRIPS generally 
prohibits WTO members from discriminating on the basis of technology 
in granting patents.
197
  Finally, TRIPS prohibits member nations’ patent 
laws from discriminating as to “the place of invention” or as to “whether 
products are imported or locally produced.”
198
  These prohibitions 
suggest that patents granted only to local inventors or local producers 
might run afoul of these rules. 
However, even if state patents diverge from TRIPS standards—
whether by offering shorter terms or by mandating local working—and 
do not fall under any of TRIPS’s exceptions, state patents would not 
implicate TRIPS.  TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement for nation 
states that join the WTO.
199
  The United States has already met TRIPS’s 
                                                          
 193.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27-33, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 194.  On TRIPS exceptions, see, e.g., Duffy, supra note 12, at 704–05 (briefly discussing TRIPS 
exceptions). 
 195.  TRIPS, supra note 193, art. 27.1. 
 196.  Id. art. 33.  
 197.  Id. art. 27.1.  On this provision and exceptions, see also Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the 
TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS 
Article 27.1, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 177, 187 (2008) (discussing pharmaceutical innovation 
exceptions under the TRIPS agreement).   
 198.  TRIPS, supra note 193, art. 27.1.  On TRIPS’s limitations on local working requirements, 
see G.B. Reddy & Harunrashid A. Kadri, Local Working of Patents—Law and Implementation in 
India, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS (Mar. 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2227573 (examining implementation concerns 
and economic benefits of local working requirements in India). 
 199.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the 
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 296 
(1997) (noting “the nature (and advantage) of a minimum standards regime is that where there is no 
‘best’ rule that will work in every economy, each country can tailor the law to its own needs”); 
Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards 
Agreements, 23 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 867, 897–98 (2008) (outlining flaws with dispute resolution 
mechanisms under the TRIPS agreement); Duffy, supra note 12, at 704–05 (advocating for a diverse 
approach to patent law).  With thanks to Margot Kaminski for this point.  
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requirements by implementing the U.S. Patent Act.  Therefore, 
concurrent state patents that do not meet TRIPS’s standards should not 
be subject to enforcement actions under the treaty. 
B.  Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law presents another potential limit on state patents.  The 
Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits certain private business activities that 
federal regulators deem to be anticompetitive.
200
  State patents could 
theoretically be vulnerable to challenges based on Section 1 or Section 2 
of the Sherman Act because they potentially confer market power on a 
private entity and can be used to restrain trade.
201
  However, antitrust law 
should not be used to challenge state patents for several reasons.  First, 
federal regulators may not have jurisdiction to challenge state patents on 
innovations that do not significantly affect interstate commerce.
202
  
Second, and more importantly, even assuming federal regulators 
have jurisdiction, based on existing case law, the “state action” doctrine 
should exempt state patents from federal antitrust review.
203
  Antitrust 
law is “directed primarily (albeit not exclusively) at market restraints and 
monopolies erected by private business firms.”
204
  State patents are not 
monopolies obtained through private action; instead, state patents are 
exclusive rights granted by an elected government or agency.  The state 
action doctrine allows state law to restrict competition in a particular 
field and maintain prices at above-market rates in the presence of a 
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to regulate 
competition” that is “actively supervised” by the state itself.
205
  Thus, as 
                                                          
 200.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 201.  Id. §§ 1–2. 
 202.  Federal antitrust law requires that the allegedly anticompetitive behavior restrain trade or 
commerce “among the several States, or with foreign nations.”  Id.  State patents do not apply 
outside the granting state’s jurisdiction so they may not meet this requirement.  See id. (forbidding 
any “attempt to monopolize”). 
 203.  See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (“We find nothing in the language of 
the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers 
or agents from activities directed by its legislature.”).  But see Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation 
and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1996) (arguing in 
favor of a revised test that asks (1) whether the state regulation generates significant monopoly 
spillovers for non-residents, and (2) whether it was decided without political participation of the 
affected nonresidents as evidenced by the lack of interstate regulatory agreement.).  
 204.  Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: 
Why We Should Follow A Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1228 (1995).  
 205.  To survive under state action doctrine, the challenged restraint must “be one clearly 
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John Shepard Wiley has pointed out, assuming a state patent created in a 
state statute is sufficiently supervised by the state or a state agent—for 
instance through price regulation and compulsory licensing—then the 
state action doctrine should defer to state regulators.
206
  In those cases 
where the state patent significantly interferes with interstate markets and 
interests outside the state, the dormant Commerce Clause is the best 
vehicle to address this concern, as argued below in Part V.D.
207
 
C. Preemption of State Patents Under Bonito 
The most important limit on state patents comes from the Supreme 
Court’s current patent preemption doctrine.  As mentioned in the 
Introduction, in a unanimous opinion in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., the Court struck down a Florida law that prohibited the 
use of a direct molding process to cheaply reproduce boat hulls in the 
state.  It concluded that federal patent law preempts states from granting 
“patent-like” rights that do not meet Congress’s “rigorous requirements 
of patentability” or that represent a “significant competitor” to U.S. 
patent rights.
208
  This rule is supposedly statutory rather than 
                                                          
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and the policy must “be actively supervised 
by the State.”  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).  
For a sub-state governmental entity, the test is different.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney 
Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1011–12, 1015 (2013) (holding that there was no clearly 
articulated state policy authorizing hospital’s acquisition of the only other general, acute care 
hospital in the region, and that the State’s grant to Georgia hospital authorities of the power to 
acquire other hospitals was no different from similar powers granted to all corporations).  In Phoebe, 
the Supreme Court clarified that “[a]s with private parties, immunity will only attach to the activities 
of local governmental entities if they are undertaken pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed’ state policy to displace competition.”  Id. at 1011 (quoting Cmty. 
Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982)).  “But unlike private parties, such entities 
are not subject to the ‘active state supervision requirement’ because they have less of an incentive to 
pursue their own self-interest under the guise of implementing state policies.”  Id. (quoting Town of 
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47 (1985)). 
 206.  John Shepard Wiley, Bonito Boats: Uninformed by Mandatory Innovation Policy, 1989 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 283, 304 (1989). 
 207.  See Gifford, supra note 204, at 1227–28 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause and 
antitrust share a common concern with facilitating trade and furthering efficient allocation of 
resources).  See also Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. LAW & 
ECON. 23, 24–26 (1983) (arguing that state action doctrine should invalidate state laws exploiting 
consumers beyond the state’s borders).   
 208.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160–61 (1989).  See also 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (holding state unfair competition law 
could not prevent copying of unpatentable pole lamp); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 
376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (ruling state unfair competition law could not prevent copying of 
unpatentable lighting fixture).  See also the analysis in Lichtman, supra note 15, at 697–700.  For a 
recent and comprehensive analysis of the Court’s IP preemption case law, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The 
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constitutional.
209
  But the Bonito Court suggested that the exclusive 
status of federal patent protection is “implicit in the Patent Clause 
itself.”
210
   
This doctrine arguably does not necessarily preempt states from 
granting state patents based on more rigorous requirements of 
patentability than U.S. patents apply.
211
  But state patents that are based 
on reduced criteria of novelty or nonobviousness, that are granted for 
subject matter that U.S. patent law otherwise excludes, that have longer 
terms or broader scopes than U.S. patents, and that generally present 




However, several scholars believe Bonito was wrongly decided.
213
  A 
comprehensive account of the Court’s complicated opinion in Bonito and 
the divergent scholarship surrounding the decision is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  But three objections are most relevant to sustaining 
concurrent state patent laws. 
First, the Bonito Court never directly confronted the fact that there is 
no express constitutional or statutory prohibition on states granting 
                                                          
Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON 
LAW 265 (Shyam Balganesh, ed., 2013).  See also Hrdy, supra note 10, at 87 (discussing advantages 
of state flexibility and experimentation with patent systems).  
 209.  See Bonito, 489 U.S. at 154 (noting state regulation of potentially patentable subject matter 
is not ipso facto pre-empted by federal patent law). 
 210.  For instance, the Bonito Court stated that “[t]he novelty and non-obviousness requirements 
of patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free 
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. . . . 
To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what 
is free for all to use.”  Id. at 151 (emphasis added).  See also Compco, 376 U.S. at 237 (noting “[for a 
state to] forbid copying [of unpatentable goods] would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to 
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.” (emphasis added)).  
See also K. David Crockett, The Salvaged Dissents of Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 13 GEO. 
MASON U. L. REV. 27, 28 (1990) (concluding that the Court in Bonito relied on theories of implied 
preemption, actual conflict preemption, and “a new ‘dormant patent clause’”).   
 211.  See Hrdy, supra note 10, at 88–89 (arguing federal patent law does not directly control 
state patent initiatives).  Bruce Bugbee has also speculated that states could grant patents on the 
same terms and conditions as Congress.  BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 102. 
 212.  See Bonito, 489 U.S. at 160–61 (noting restrictions placed on states as a result of federal 
preemption).  The Federal Circuit has also suggested that the Patent Act preempts the entire field of 
patent law, in contrast to unfair competition law.  See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, 
Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no field preemption of state unfair competition 
claims that were related to federal patent laws).  But see Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684–
85 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (distinguishing state statutes that prohibit one form of copying, such as using 
plug molding, and patent laws), overruled by Bonito, 489 U.S. at 143–44. 
 213.  Wiley, supra note 206, at 304; Lichtman, supra note 15, at 712–14; Crockett, supra note 
210, at 28. 
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exclusive rights that resemble federal patents.  The IP Clause does not 
mention or address the states in any way.
214
  The Patent Act, unlike the 
Copyright Act, has never had an express preemption provision.
215
  The 
Bonito Court purported to uphold Goldstein’s position that the IP Clause 
does not apply to the states and noted the absence of express 
Congressional prohibitions on states’ power to “adopt rules for the 
promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions[,]” such 
as trade secret laws.
216
  But the Court did not mention states’ historic 
powers to grant patents or the reasons the Framers, along with courts and 
commentators throughout the nineteenth century, chose to keep states’ 
concurrent patent powers intact.
217
  The Framers considered concurrent 
state patent powers an important concession to state sovereignty and 
deliberately chose to retain the powers.
218
  As John Wiley has also 
observed, the Court’s statement that “[o]ne of the fundamental purposes 
behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to 
promote national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property[]” is 
misleading; the Court’s only support for this point is the fact that 
Congress gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases 
involving federal patents in 1800,
219
 and James Madison’s comments in 
the Federalist No. 43.  Yet Madison never suggested state patents are 
undesirable, as the Bonito Court implied.
220
  Madison simply stated that 
states could not “separately make effectual provision[]” for patents (or 
copyrights) due to their limited jurisdictions.
221
  Thus, contrary to the 
                                                          
 214.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
 215.  The Copyright Act of 1976 has an express preemption provision.  17 U.S.C. § 301 (2011); 
see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2011) (lacking an express preemption provision in the Patent Act).   
 216.  Bonito, 489 U.S. at 165 (noting IP clause does not deprive states of power to “adopt rules 
for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions”), 154–56 (discussing state 
laws that are permitted such as trade secrets (citing Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973); 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974))). 
 217.  See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns 507, 581–82 (N.Y. 1812) (James Kent, C.J.) (holding 
courts must apply a strong presumption in favor of validity of state patents instead of assuming 
federal preemption); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 48 (1824) (noting states have concurrent patent 
power with federal government); and Part II, supra (discussing historic views of state patent 
powers). 
 218.  Hrdy, State Patents in the Age of Laissez Faire, supra note 32, at 70–76. 
 219.  “Since the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has lodged exclusive jurisdiction of actions 
‘arising under’ the patent laws in the federal courts, thus allowing for the development of a uniform 
body of law in resolving the constant tension between private right and public access.”  Bonito, 489 
U.S. at 162. 
 220.  See id. (“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the 
Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property.” (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison))). 
 221.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), available at 
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Court’s suggestion, there is no constitutional, legislative, or historical 
basis for completely preempting states’ authority to grant patents. 
A second, closely related reason the Bonito rule is wrong is that it 
pays insufficient deference to independent federalism-based justifications 
for concurrent state power to grant patents.
222
  Along with the market-
correcting boost to innovation already emphasized, these benefits include 
promoting experimentation, innovation, and competition among 
decentralized political units in designing patent law and policy;
223
 
allowing “dissent” against federal patent norms by making state patent 
alternatives available;
224
 creating positive externalities for other states by 
encouraging inventors to obtain state patents rather than nationwide 
                                                          
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa43.htm.  See also Wiley, supra note 206, at 295–96. 
 222.  See Yoo, supra note 9, at 1403 (arguing for judicial protections for federalism through 
judicial review, based on both historic precedent and economic theories of federalism).  See also 
Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012) (discussing the 
wide range of benefits federalism can produce). 
 223.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).  Scholars of federalism 
have long argued over whether states produce legal innovations for other states, see, e.g., Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reflection: Does Federalism Promote Innovations?, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 593 (1980), and patent law scholars have recently drawn on these arguments in advocating for 
more experimentation in order to improve the design of patent incentives.  See Ouellette, supra note 
12, at 2, 17.  But see Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1335 (2009) (arguing states may have insufficient 
incentive to invest in legal innovation due to chance of copying by other states); Ouellette, supra 
note 12, at 15 (asserting that governments may under-innovate since they cannot internalize the full 
benefits of their innovation policies).  For citations to economic literature favoring decentralized 
rather than centralized policymaking structures, generally, see Wu, supra note 132, at 124 n.3.  See 
also Richard Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837, 1838–39 nn.1–3 
(2010).  Notably, when Craig Nard and John Duffy discuss the potential competitive benefits of 
decentralization in designing patent laws in the federal courts of appeal, they draw on models of 
political decentralization.  They write: 
The beneficial effects of competition provide a powerful justification for decentralized 
decision-making.  Competition serves as an important check on poor decisions.  In the 
marketplace, it punishes firms that make poor decisions about product design and price.  
In the political marketplace, it polices against candidates who adopt stances poorly 
aligned with the views of voters.  And for states and nations, it provides incentives to 
adopt reasonable laws that will not cause businesses, investment, and individuals to flee 
the jurisdiction. 
See Nard & Duffy, supra note 12, at 1629.  
 224.  See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009) (arguing that states can serve simultaneously as cooperative “servants” 
carrying out federal policies and as autonomous “dissenters” against federal policy norms; and that, 
in fact, a state’s status as a “servant, insider, and ally might enable it to be a sometime dissenter, 
rival, and challenger” (emphasis added)); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8–10 (2010) (arguing that by participating in governance at the local 
level minorities can find a voice for their dissenting viewpoints); see also Hrdy, supra note 10, at 84 
(arguing that, by obtaining state patents, inventors who disagree with U.S. patent policy can 
encourage states to adopt reforms that facilitate open innovation, while also preventing others from 
patenting at the federal level). 
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exclusive rights to their inventions;
225
 facilitating matching of residents 
with heterogeneous preferences to different jurisdictions with 
homogenous goals and resources;
226
 and potentially providing states with 
a less wasteful form of “locational incentive” than tax credits.
227
  
The Bonito Court’s failure to take any of these potential benefits into 
account sharply conflicts with the Court’s more lenient approach to trade 
secret laws in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., where the Court 
assessed the risks trade secrets posed to innovation but found them 
justified given the variety of independent benefits trade secret protections 
can produce, including providing incentives to generate unpatentable 




Third, and finally, although the Court’s decision to preempt a state 
law covering an unpatentable boat hull design was premised on the 
desire to preserve appropriate incentives to invent and disclose new 
inventions, the decision may lead to a worse system for promoting 
innovation.
229
  As Lichtman has convincingly argued, the Bonito Court 
                                                          
 225.  See Hrdy, supra note 10, at 84 (noting that state patents “prevent any single entity from 
obtaining national control of the invention, spurring competition and productive reuses in other 
states” while also giving “the inventor a ‘complete and perfect’ right within a chosen locality”).  See 
also Wu, supra note 132, at 126 (emphasizing the importance of decentralization and competition in 
promoting innovation, citing work by scholars like Robert Merges and Richard Nelson). 
 226.  The federalism-based benefit of jurisdictional matching is derived from Charles Tiebout’s 
and more recent federalism scholars’ theories that state and local governments can offer optimized 
“packages” of goods and services that appeal to a homogenous group of mobile firms and residents, 
thus ensuring efficient delivery of local public goods based on particularized needs and preferences.  
See MUELLER, supra note 9, at 77–83; Yoo, supra note 9, at 1402 (explaining the benefits of 
federalism as a “decentralized decisionmaking system that is more responsive to local interests and 
preference, that can tailor programs to local conditions and needs, and that can provide innovation in 
creating new programs”); COOTER, supra note 9, at 105–06, 129–30 (explaining that “people with 
similar tastes voluntarily luster together in order to enjoy their preferred combination of local public 
goods” (citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956))). 
 227.  The notion that state patents could provide a less risky incentive than tax credits for 
encouraging innovators to locate in their optimal jurisdictions is derived from Clayton Gillette’s 
article in defense of state business incentives as locational incentives.  See Gillette, supra note 7, at 
448–51.   
 228.  See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487–93 (1974) (noting that 
“misallocation of resources and economic waste [] would thus take place if trade secret protection 
were abolished”).  As Steven Yelderman has pointed out to me, the Court’s decision conflicts starkly 
with antitrust law’s state action doctrine, mentioned above, which recognizes the benefits of 
deferring to state authority in sanctioning local monopolies. 
 229.  This statement is illustrative of the Court’s goal to preserve incentives to disclose and 
invent:  
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or 
design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large 
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made questionable assumptions about the effects of competing state 
protections on overall levels of investment in innovation.
230
  According 
to the Bonito Court, competing state incentives might reduce inventors’ 
incentives to generate and disclose inventions meeting the “rigorous” 
federal standards of patentability, diverting their efforts away from 
generating patentable inventions towards any number of lesser 
innovations meeting states’ criteria.
231
  However, Lichtman contends, 
allowing states to grant patents covering unpatentable subject matter that 
nevertheless involves some level of technological risk might just as 
easily lead to more, rather than less, investment in innovation.  For 
example, it could lead to more investment in expensive and high quality 
boat hulls that are easy to copy, and less investment in Florida real estate 
or movie theaters.
232
  By completely eliminating states’ power to grant 
“patent-like” rights—even when those rights are limited to prohibiting 
particularly fast and cheap forms of copying
233
—the Court deprived 
states of their ability to provide exclusive-rights-based protections for 
unpatentable innovations that might be of high social value. This result 
leaves states reliant on the variety of cash-based incentives discussed 
previously in Part III.D. 
                                                          
impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the 
centerpiece of federal patent policy.  Moreover, through the creation of patent-like rights, 
the States could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of 
patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years. 
Bonito, 489 U.S. at 156–57. 
 230.  Lichtman, supra note 15, at 713–18. 
 231.  Bonito, 489 U.S. at 160–61.  See also Lichtman, supra note 15, at 697–98.  For examples 
of how patents can distort innovation by directing investment into different types of productions, see 
Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century 
World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1214–36 (2005), available at www.nber.org/papers/w9909 
(finding that in countries without patent laws, inventors concentrated in industries where secrecy was 
effective relative to patents, e.g., food processing and scientific instruments, and suggesting that 
“introducing strong and effective patent laws in countries without patents may have stronger effects 
on changing the direction of innovative activity than on raising the number of innovations”); Amy 
Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 
1900, 1901 (2013) (arguing that patents direct investment away from subject matter that is more 
difficult to exclude, such as medical checklists).   
 232.  Lichtman, supra note 15, at 718.  Perhaps the best testament to Lichtman’s point is the fact 
that, about ten years after Bonito was decided, and one year after Lichtman wrote his article, 
Congress enacted the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (VHDPA), which had the purpose to 
prevent cheap imitation of boat hulls nationwide.  See Title V of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No., 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), ‘Vessel Hull Design Protection Act,’ now 
codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332 (1998). 
 233.  Prior to Bonito, the Federal Circuit had upheld a California law prohibiting copying of 
articles using the plug molding process.  See Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684–85 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985), overruled by Bonito, 489 U.S. at 143–44. 
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 The Bonito Court’s decision to do away with state protections for 
innovations that are unpatentable makes little sense given the uncertainty 
involved in calibrating incentives for intellectual production.
234
  Not only 
is it easy for Congress to err in designing incentives to innovate, but it is 
difficult for judges to evaluate the success of state legislators in 
supplementing federal incentives.
235
  Thus, as Wiley puts it, “[i]t . . . is 
possible to see the Bonito Boats decision as expressing a federal policy to 
enforce an optimal regime of innovation incentives”; but the opinion 
“cannot justify itself on these grounds because we have no reason to 
consider federal courts to be better judges than state legislators of when 
added protection is efficient.”
236
  In sum, by striking down the Florida 
statute and effectively prohibiting other states from granting similar 
rights, the Court far exceeded the scope of its ability and authority to 
review the economic efficiency of state laws.
237
  This is why Justice Kent 
proposed in 1812 that courts should not take it upon themselves to 
determine whether a state patent is “inexpedient or unwise.”
238
  In Kent’s 
view, deliberation by elected state legislators is a more legitimate and 
reliable way to determine whether a patent is economically justified than 
a substantive judicial review by members of the judiciary.
239
  
 For all these reasons, Bonito should be overruled or at least 
substantially limited in its scope at the next opportunity.  State 
protections for intellectual productions do not, as a per se rule, risk 
hindering innovation just because they compete with federal patent 
incentives; and they could produce many independent local and national 
                                                          
 234.  Wiley, supra note 206, at 300–01. 
 235.  Id. at 300–02. 
 236.  Id. at 302. 
 237.  Paul Heald disagrees, arguing that the Court properly applied economic analysis in striking 
down the law because “the Florida statute has no qualitative requirements” and “stimulates the flow 
of capital into boat hull design and allows boat manufacturers to obtain a monopoly price without 
any attempt to guarantee that the public will benefit through better boat design.”  Paul Heald, 
Federal Intellectual Property Laws and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 987 
(1991) (emphasis added).   
 238.  Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns 507, 572 (N.Y. 1812).  Justice Kent opined in Livingston 
that when a court reviewed patents granted by state legislatures, “the presumption must be admitted 
to be extremely strong in favor of their validity.  There is no very obvious constitutional objection, 
or it would not so repeatedly have escaped the notice of the several branches of the government, 
when these acts were under consideration.”  Id.  “These grants may possibly be inexpedient or 
unwise, but that has nothing to do with the question of constitutional right.”  Id. at 573. 
 239.  See id. See also Patricia Wald, Limits on the Use of Economic Analysis in Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 225 (1988) (casting doubt on the wisdom of 
judges attempting or purporting to be economically sophisticated in their decision-making and 
expressing concern about the shifting balance of power between the different branches of 
government heralded by increased use of economic analysis by the judiciary). 
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benefits.  This is not to say that states should have free license to grant 
patents.  Just as with other state business incentives, state patents may 
impose external costs on other states that the granting state does not have 
to fully internalize.
240
  The Bonito Court itself alluded to this risk, albeit 
with very little discussion, stating that “absent [a uniform national rule,] 
each State could afford patent-like protection to particularly favored 




 The Court apparently assumed, however, that the IP Clause and the 
Patent Act are the proper mechanisms for addressing this concern.
242
  
But, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized in 1824, the proper vehicle for 
judicial scrutiny of state patents is the dormant Commerce Clause.
243
  
Statutory preemption under the Patent Act looks only at whether a state 
law conflicts with the goal of federal patent law to promote innovation—
a conflict that does not exist for state patents any more than it does for 
trade secrets or state R&D tax credits.
244
  Meanwhile, as explained in the 
next section, addressing local protectionism and maintaining the integrity 
of the national market is the primary function of the Supreme Court’s 
modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
245
 
                                                          
 240.  See Gillette, supra note 7, at 450.  See also discussion infra Part V.D. 
 241.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 163 (1989). 
 242.  As noted below, the Goldstein Court had also taken this approach with respect to copyright.  
Wiley suggests that state action doctrine is the appropriate channel for addressing concerns about 
protectionism.  Wiley, supra note 206 at 303–04.  But this might leave state patents without any 
federal review.  Given the potential risks to out-of-staters, discussed below, I think some judicial 
review is necessary.  See Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 23 (1983) (arguing that state action doctrine should invalidate state laws that exploit 
consumers beyond the state’s borders).   
 243.  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 239 (1824) (stating that because other issues decided the 
case—namely, a potential conflict with interstate commerce and direct actual conflict with 
Gibbons’s federal coasting license—there was no need to address patent preemption, and leaving 
Justice Kent’s opinion that states have concurrent patent power intact). 
 244.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974). 
 245.  As Clayton Gillette writes, explaining the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to 
state locational incentives, generally:  
Contemporary literature views the Commerce Clause largely as a response to fears that 
states, left to their own devices, would regulate trade in a protectionist manner, and thus 
seek to exploit monopolies or otherwise impose external costs that the regulating state did 
not have to internalize.  Thus, states would likely regulate even where regulatory costs 
exceeded benefits, as long as those costs are imposed on residents of other jurisdictions, 
or on politically powerless groups within the regulating jurisdiction.   
Gillette, supra note 7, at 450–51.  See also, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 
188 (1994) (invalidating tax and subsidy scheme favoring in-state producers of milk); Carbone, Inc. 
v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994) (invalidating law forcing state residents to deliver 
their waste to a private in-state waste transfer facility).   
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D. A Revised Approach to Judicial Review of State Patents 
In stark contrast to the Court in Bonito, as well as prior scholars’ 
approaches,
246
 this Article proposes that, with three major exceptions, 
states should be able to grant patents outside the bounds of the Patent Act 
and unrestrained by the limitations of the IP Clause.  Courts should strike 
down state patents in three circumstances: (1) a state patent holder seeks 
a U.S. patent on the same invention as is covered by his or her state 
patent in contravention of the Patent Act’s historic relinquishment 
provision;
247
 (2) a state patent directly conflicts with a valid U.S. patent, 
in contravention of the Supremacy Clause;
248
 or (3) a state patent violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause.
249




                                                          
 246.  Lichtman saw judicial review (apparently under the Patent Act or the IP Clause) as a 
“second line of defense” should states “err” in granting patent-like rights.  Lichtman, supra note 15, 
at 731.  He suggested that states’ authority to grant patent-like rights should be limited to passing 
narrowly tailored anti-copying laws specifically directed at helping developers of innovations in 
vulnerable markets recoup the costs of development.  See id. at 730–31.  
 247.  Patent Act of 1793 § 7, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 317 (February 21, 1793). 
 248.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 2. 
 249.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 250. Today it seems clear that most legal challenges to state patents would be adjudicated by 
federal courts based on their exclusive jurisdiction over all cases “relating to patents[.]” See 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2011) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and 
trademarks.  No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.”)  Congress reformed § 1338 in 
2011, after the Supreme Court held that a counterclaim of patent infringement brought in state court 
did not necessarily fall within the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, in order to clarify that 
state courts cannot hear such counterclaims.  See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).  Even a case presenting only 
claims created by state law can still be subject to federal jurisdiction if the case involves a federal 
issue that is (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution 
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.  Grable & Sons 
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); see also Gunn v. Minton, 133 
S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (holding attorney malpractice claim, which required deciding whether 
experimental use defense to the on-sale bar to patent validity would have prevailed if raised earlier in 
a federal patent infringement suit, did not “arise under” federal law for purposes of § 1338 and was 
within the jurisdiction of a state court). For a recent analysis of federal court jurisdiction vis-à-vis 
state courts, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, draft dated 7/12/2013, presented at IP 
Scholars August 8, 2013 (reviewing the reasons why federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent cases, and concluding that few would choose to litigate a patent case in state court even if 
jurisdiction were made concurrent). 
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1. Relinquishment upon Obtaining a U.S. Patent 
The clearest limit on state patents is triggered when inventors 
attempt to rely on both state and federal patents for the same invention at 
the same time.  Thomas Jefferson recognized this problem after his term 
as the first Secretary of State, where he was responsible for reviewing 
patent applications and issuing patents.
251
  At Jefferson’s behest, the 
Patent Act of 1793 provided that a state patent would be automatically 
relinquished if the patentee obtained a patent from the U.S. government 
for the same invention, and that applying for a U.S. patent would be 
evidence of such relinquishment.
252
  Jefferson thought the relinquishment 
requirement was important because it would prevent U.S. patentees who 
possessed state patents from getting an unfair advantage over U.S. 
patentees who did not.
253
 
Today, this problem would be less likely to arise.  Ever since the 
overhaul of the Patent Act in 1836, patent applications have been 
reviewed by professional examiners to determine whether an invention 
meets the Act’s requirements of patentability.
254
  The Patent Act does not 
allow inventors to obtain patents for inventions that were “patented, 
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise 
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.”
255
  Accordingly, inventors possessing state patents would 
generally be preempted from later applying for a federal patent on the 
same invention.  That said, the Patent Act makes certain exceptions—
most notably, for disclosures made by the inventor him or herself or 
disclosures made by third parties after the inventor has previously made 
a “public disclosure” one year or less before the effective patent filing 
                                                          
 251.  NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE, supra note 45, at 437–38. 
 252.  The Patent Act of 1793 required inventors who obtained U.S. patents to automatically 
“relinquish” any patents granted by a state “before its adoption of the [Constitution.]” Sec. 7, Act of 
February 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 317.  See also NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE, supra note 45, at 437 (quoting 
language that ultimately became a part of the 1793 statute).  The substantially revised Patent Act of 
1836 does not contain this provision.  Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836). 
 253.  See NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE, supra note 45, at 437 (discussing Jefferson’s early draft of 
the preemption provision). 
 254.  See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 26, at 8 (describing institution of formal examination 
system in 1836). 
 255.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (as amended in 2011) (emphasis added). This provision of the AIA 
has a similar effect as the old Section 102 in the 1952 Patent Act, though it changes the crucial date 
from the date of invention to the date of filing.  See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under 
the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1023–24 (2012) [hereinafter Priority and Novelty].  This 
reflects the Patent Act of 1952’s notion of a one-year “grace period.”  See id. at 1025 (explaining 
that the “grace period provision” is an exception to the novelty rule).  
 
534 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
date.
256
  Therefore, public disclosures made by inventors in state patents 
could potentially qualify for an exception to the Patent Act’s novelty bar 
so long as they are made within one year of filing for the U.S. patent.
257
  
This means, theoretically, that the inventor could fall under the exception 
by obtaining, for example, a thirty-year New York patent and then 
applying a few months later for a U.S. patent.  The inventor would either 
get a U.S. patent with a new filing date or get the benefit of the state 
patent filing date.
258
  This would effectively lead to around twenty years 




However, even though the Patent Act no longer contains the 1793 
Act’s relinquishment provision, the Constitution itself may require 
inventors to relinquish any state patents they possess upon obtaining U.S. 
patents for the same invention.  The IP Clause gives Congress power to 
secure inventors’ “exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”
260
  
James Madison’s statement in the Federalist indicates that the reason the 
Framers believed this power was necessary was that states could not 
“separately make effectual provision” for patents (or copyrights) due to 
their limited jurisdictions.
261
  The entire basis for giving Congress the 
power to grant patents was that states could not effectively protect the 
exclusive rights of inventors wishing to market their inventions in 
interstate commerce.  Given this rationale, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that if the Framers had thought about it, they would have 
agreed that U.S. patents should not be available when an inventor 
                                                          
 256.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).  See also Priority and Novelty, supra note 255, at 1031 (explaining 
the constitutional disclosure provisions).  
 257.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b).   
 258.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  For purposes of comparison, those who obtain patents in countries that 
are part of the Paris Convention and then apply for a U.S. patent get the benefit of the filing date of 
their foreign patent if they file for the U.S. patent within twelve months of the foreign filing date.  35 
U.S.C. § 119.  See also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 26, at 498–99. 
 259.  In my opinion, overlapping state and federal patent rights would be confusing and 
unnecessary.  But the possibility of state-level term extensions is another matter.  Justice Kent’s 
dicta in Livingston suggested that, as of 1812, states could grant state patents for inventions whose 
U.S. patents had expired.  Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns 507, 581 (N.Y. 1812).  Thus, in this 
hypothetical, New York could grant a separate ten-year patent to the inventor following the 
expiration of his or her U.S. patent, with the same effect of an additional ten years of exclusivity 
only within New York.  This would effectively serve as a localized patent extension.  See, e.g., 
Evans v. Jordan, 9 Cranch 199, 202–04 (1815) (upholding a private bill giving Oliver Evans another 
fourteen years’ worth of U.S. exclusivity for his flour mill).  Today, the FDA grants term extensions 
for pharmaceutical drugs.  Roin, supra note 15, at 564–68.  
 260.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 261.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa43.htm. 
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decided, for whatever reason, that a state patent was an “effectual 
provision.”  The states themselves appeared to accept this limitation: 
some of the states indicated in patents they granted after 1790 that the 
state grant would be void if the inventor later obtained a U.S. federal 
patent for the same invention under the Patent Act.
262
  Given this history, 
the IP Clause, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause requiring states 
to follow federal law, should trigger a direct conflict when an inventor 
tries to rely on both federal and state patents for the same invention at the 




2. Direct Conflicts with U.S. Patents 
The second limit on state patents, which Justice Kent recognized in 
Livingston, is that any state patent that directly conflicts with a U.S. 
patent will be invalid, so long as the U.S. patent holder proves that the 
state patent infringes the U.S. patent and that the U.S. patent is valid.
264
  
This theory is based on direct conflict preemption principles and a plain 
reading of the Constitution.
265
  The IP Clause authorizes Congress to 
secure to inventors the “exclusive Right . . . to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries,”
266
 and the Supremacy Clause states that the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”
267
  Once a U.S. patent is issued to an inventor pursuant 
to the Patent Act, states are generally bound by the Supremacy Clause to 
                                                          
 262.  See BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 102 (discussing voidance clause in a New Hampshire patent 
for “building Chimneys and altering those already built”). 
 263.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (explaining the general right of Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).  Besides state-level “term 
extensions,” mentioned in note 259, supra, another way to get around the preemption provision 
would be for a state to grant patents lasting under one year.  Upon expiration of the state patent, the 
inventor could still apply for U.S. patents on the same invention, assuming the state patent falls 
within the § 102(b) grace period or is treated like a foreign patent under § 119. 
 264.  Livingston, 9 Johns at 582–83. 
 265.  Kent used Alexander Hamilton’s constitutional test for preemption.  Livingston, 9 Johns at 
576.  Today, there are a number of constitutional and statutory preemption doctrines that invoke a 
similar principle of “direct conflict” or “actual conflict” with federal law. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, 
Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 560, 606 (1992–1993) (explaining the benefits of a conflict preemption approach). 
 266.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 267.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
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respect and uphold that right.
268
  Thus, a state patent that overlaps with a 
U.S. patent would, if properly challenged in federal court, “be obliged to 




The preexistence of U.S. patents is a problem that other scholars 
have encountered in proposals intended to promote commercialization of 
unworked U.S. patents.
270
  However, in the context of state patents, the 
Supremacy Clause already provides a framework for addressing this 
problem. Absent some other form of federal authorization for the state 
legislation, if a court finds that a state patent infringes a U.S. patent, the 
court would be bound to provide “competent redress.”
271
  Under the 
Patent Act, the court could grant damages.
272




                                                          
 268.  See Livingston, 9 Johns at 582. 
 269.  Id. (“If, then, the respondents were in possession of a [U.S.] patent for their steam-boat, as 
original inventors, our statute prohibition . . . would possibly, before a competent tribunal, be 
obliged to yield to the patent right, as being founded on the paramount law.”).   
 270.  Ted Sichelman addresses the problem of potential conflicts between commercialization 
patents and invention patents, concluding that commercialization patent holders should not be 
subject to injunctions from the holders of un-worked U.S. patents and should be limited to a fixed, 
small percentage royalty, such as one to two percent.  Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, supra 
note 15, at 405. 
 271.  Livingston, 9 Johns at 582–83. 
 272.  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  It is unlikely that the patentee could also successfully sue the state 
for damages.  See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
647–48 (1999) (holding that a state was immune from suit in federal court for patent infringement 
claims where Congress had unsuccessfully tried to abrogate state immunity for such lawsuits). 
 273.  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title 
may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right 
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).  According to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ebay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, the federal courts have discretion whether to 
grant injunctive relief. 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (holding that plaintiffs in patent cases do not 
automatically get injunctions and relief may be limited to money damages appropriate to compensate 
for any infringement that may have occurred).  In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested 
that in deciding whether to enjoin a losing defendant’s activity, the court should consider whether 
the plaintiff was using his patent not “as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, 
primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See also Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, supra note 15, at 405 n.366 (explaining Justice Kennedy’s pronouncement 
that “an injunction may not serve the public interest” and that his concurring opinion is “consistent 
with a market experimentation theory”).  Therefore, if the U.S. patentee is not currently practicing 
the invention and is simply using the patent to extract exorbitant license fees, the U.S. patent holder 
may be limited to damages.  See id. at 405–06 (noting similar operation of Ebay’s rule on the 
author’s proposed commercialization patent scheme). 
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3. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
a. The Risk of Local Protectionism and Races to the Bottom 
As explained above in Part V.C., the Bonito Court erred in its 
presumption that state patents would necessarily hinder rather than 
promote innovation.  The bigger problem, which the Court only hinted 
at, is that, like other state business incentives, state patents might be 
abused to promote local interests at the expense of national interests and 
trigger wasteful “races to the bottom” among states for business activity 
and revenues.
274
  For instance, a state could begin offering fifty-year 
patents as a way to compete with other states for the best inventors and 
for patent filing fees, resulting in overly long and broad rights that are 
adverse to public welfare.
275
  This arguably occurred when states were 
exclusively responsible for granting patents during the 1780s and granted 
remarkably broad and overlapping patents for the steamboat to the same 
or different inventors.
276
  Even when states grant patents that lead to 
more socially optimal levels of innovation within the state, this could 
                                                          
 274.  A paradigmatic example of a “race to the bottom” comes from state incorporation laws, 
which provide companies with the privilege of being organized under the laws of the state or doing 
business in the state.  Many have argued states have incentives to craft lenient incorporation laws in 
order to attract corporations, but that this is to the potential detriment of other states and corporate 
shareholders, who suffer from rules that are overly favorable to management. Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1992).  As already mentioned, another example of a “race to the bottom” 
is R&D tax credits.  Some argue that states have created overly favorable credits in order to attract or 
retain businesses, and that these credits have resulted in losses to local taxpayers when states pay too 
much and deadweight loss from the national perspective because any gains created in one 
jurisdiciton may be due to less investment in another. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 451 
(summarizing this argument and other arguments made by opponents of state and city locational 
incentives). 
 275.  Attorney General William Wirt made this argument in Gibbons v. Ogden, arguing that 
states would compete against one another to offer the most attractive patent rights in order to 
convince inventors to locate in their territories. 22 U.S. 1, 169 (1824) (“This concurrent legislation 
would degenerate into advertisements for custom.  These powers would be in the market, and the 
highest bidder would take all.”). Note that because states must also compete with U.S. patents for 
applicants and filing fees, they may be even more likely to provide excessive terms and scopes due 
to a “ratchet effect.”  Most reasonable inventors would not accept a state patent covering precisely 
the same subject matter and with precisely the same term and scope as a U.S. patent.  Therefore, they 
would demand state patents with longer terms or broader scopes on otherwise unpatentable subject 
matter.  Thanks to Jack Balkin for this point. 
 276.  See Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a 
“First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 269–77 (1995) (discussing a patent battle 
between two steamboat inventors who each claimed state patent rights); Merges & Reynolds, supra 
note 119, at 45, 48–49 (explaining the problem of conflicting steamboat monopolies); State Patent 
Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, supra note 32, at 78–79 (describing the broad New York 
steamboat patent).   
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simply be the result of firms and investors relocating or investing less in 
other states.
277
  States could also adopt any number of “beggar thy 
neighbor” policies, such as patents that effectively exclude out-of-state 
competitors from entering local markets.  This arguably occurred in 
Bonito, where Florida adopted a law that effectively prevented Tennessee 
boat hull makers from selling boat hulls made using plug molds in 
Florida.
278
  This, in turn, could lead to reprisals from other states—for 
instance, a Tennessee law prohibiting copying of some product Florida 
businesses wish to sell in Tennessee.  The end result could be a “thicket” 
of un-navigable state patent rights, many of which are not actually 
necessary to promote innovation.
279
 
Unjustified or over-protective patents and “thickets” of patents 
within a local industry would likely generate deadweight loss and 
unnecessary transaction costs for residents and voters in the granting 
state.
280
  But out-of-state firms and consumers would be particularly at 
risk because their interests may not have been taken into account in 
legislators’ decision to grant the patents.
281
  True, state patents only apply 
in the granting state and do not directly harm consumers and businesses 
                                                          
 277.  At least one economic study has attempted to show that increases in local R&D investment 
as a result of state R&D tax credits are due to less investment in other states.  See Wilson, supra note 
7, at 433 fig.1. 
 278.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989). 
 279.  On thickets and patent gridlock, see Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–701 (1998) 
(discussing patent gridlock in the context of biomedical research).  See also Michael Mattioli, 
Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 110–16 (2012) (describing the problem of 
patent gridlock).  That said, states could adopt policies to facilitate licensing, such as online clearing-
houses, or rely on private ordering solutions like collective rights organizations.  See Kirti Gupta, The 
Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World: A Literature Review 3–4 (Northwestern Law Sch. 
Searle Center Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/programs/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Gupta_p
atent-policy-debate-literature-review.pdf (discussing private ordering solutions to patent thickets as 
well as the difficulty of finding empirical evidence that patent thickets exist).  For a general 
discussion of private ordering solutions to IP gridlock, including “collective rights organizations,” 
see Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
 280.  This is arguably what happened in Gibbons, where the well-connected and rich 
businessman Robert Livingston convinced New York to transfer John Fitch’s patent on the 
steamboat to him.  Thereafter, steamboat fares rose to excessive rates across the board until the 
Supreme Court struck down the monopoly.  Hrdy, State Patents in the Age of Laissez-Faire, supra 
note 32, at 78.   
 281.  Some argue that out-of-state interests can be protected “by what amounts to a system of 
virtual representation” if similarly situated interests are located in the state and participating in the 
local political process.  See, e.g., Kellen S. Dwyer, Dormant Commerce Clause Review of Public-
Private Partnerships After United Haulers: A Competitive Bidding Solution, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 203, 222 (2011) (explaining John Hart Ely’s virtual representation theory).  
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in other states.
282
  In fact, they may benefit other states by providing 
useful information that is free for copying and use outside the state.
283
  
However, state patents could significantly raise the cost of business for 
out-of-state firms, as occurred in Bonito,
284
 or raise prices for out-of-state 
consumers of certain localized goods and services.
285
 
b. The Applicability of the Dormant Commerce Clause to State Patents 
As already alluded to, concern for out-of-state interests is at the heart 
of the Supreme Court’s modern dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.  Although many contend that dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence is confused,
286
 “[t]here is general agreement on the 
objectives that the Clause seeks to serve, typically phrased in terms of 
creating a ‘national market,’ or preventing one jurisdiction from 
discriminating against another.”
287
  Adopting a “political process” theory 
of judicial review, courts historically gave deference to state laws that 
treated in-state and out-of-state interests alike, and remained skeptical of 
laws that are more favorable to in-state interests or underrepresented 
minorities.
288
  Courts already apply this doctrine regularly in addressing 
                                                          
 282.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973).  
 283.  See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 14, at 258 (citing the development of the 
computer-based spreadsheet as a beneficiary of this phenomenon). See also Hrdy, supra note 10, at 
83 (discussing the effect of innovation spillovers).  
 284.  Again, an example is New York’s patent on the steamboat in Gibbons, which prevented 
Thomas Gibbons, a New Jersey operator, from operating steamboats in New York without a license.  
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824).   
 285.  An example is the hypothetical California patent on the high-density olive harvesting 
techniques mentioned above.  See supra Part III.C.  By shielding an in-state company from 
competition (both domestic and out-of-state), the patent might raise the price of California olives and 
California olive oil for out-of-state consumers. 
 286.  Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Scalia have suggested abandoning the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The negative Commerce Clause has no 
basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice.”); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. 
Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for 
Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 29, 29 (2002) (“I conclude that the time has come to scrap the dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibition on discriminatory taxation.  Since the judicially-created prohibition has served its 
historic purpose, to create a single common market of the United States, it can now safely be laid to 
rest.”).  But, as discussed below, a clear application of the doctrine does in fact exist in the state 
patent context. 
 287.  Gillette, supra note 7, at 493 (citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 288.  The “political process theory” of the dormant Commerce Clause dates back to at least 
1938, when Justice Harlan Stone wrote that “when the regulation is of such a character that its 
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challenges to a wide variety of state business incentives, including state 
tax credits.
289
  There is no reason it should not apply to state patents as 
well. 
But to the bemusement of scholars like Arthur Miller, this is not the 
direction the Supreme Court has taken when addressing state IP rights.
290
  
In Goldstein, where the Court decided states have concurrent power to 
create IP protections, the Court did not address the dormant Commerce 
Clause directly but stated that the doctrine’s major concern—namely, 
local protectionism at the expense of other states—was not a significant 
risk for state copyright laws due to their limited jurisdiction.
291
  If one 
state granted a copyright in certain kinds of creative works but other 
states did not, citizens from other states would still be free to make 
unauthorized copies of those works within their own borders.
292
   
                                                          
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to 
those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some 
interests within the state.”  South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 
177, 185 n.2 (1938).  See also United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 332 (upholding state forced-use law 
requiring delivery of all in-state trash to a state-owned facility in part because the main burden of the 
law—the increased price of waste collection—fell mainly on state residents rather than out-of-state 
residents); Gillette, supra note 7, at 450 (explaining the “political process theory” view); Hellerstein 
& Coenen, supra note 7, at 806 (arguing that the court should only strike down a state tax incentive 
that favors in-state over out-of-state activities and “implicate[s] the coercive power of the state”); 
Dwyer, supra note 282, at 222 (explaining that the “Court has struck a balance” by giving deference 
to laws that treat in-state and out-of-state businesses the same and “skeptically reviewing legislation 
that treats local firms better than out-of-state firms . . . because it is thought likely that local firms 
obtained the favorable legislation via the political advantage they enjoy over their out-of-state 
counterparts”). 
 289.  For a thorough canvassing of recent jurisprudence and articles on Commerce Clause 
challenges to tax incentives designed to entice companies to locate and do business in the state, see 
BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 
8.05 n.51 (2d. ed. 2012).  The Supreme Court recently declined to rule on the constitutionality of the 
state of Ohio’s aggressive tax credit scheme, which allowed businesses to receive credit against the 
state franchise tax for qualifying investments of “new manufacturing machinery and equipment” 
used within the state, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the challenge.  See 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344–47 (2006) (overturning Cuno v. 
DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), which struck down Ohio’s tax credit scheme 
under the dormant Commerce Clause; and dismissing the case based on lack of Article III standing 
because the plaintiff taxpayers’ injury was too “conjectural or hypothetical” and not redressable).  
See also Jonathan Edwards, Casenote, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: The Supreme Court Hits the Brakes 
on Determining the Constitutionality of Investment Incentives Given by States to Corporate America, 
58 MERCER L. REV. 1411, 1420–23 (2007) (explaining the Court’s rationale in DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno). 
 290.  Miller, supra note 15, at 749. 
 291.  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973). 
 292.  In investigating “whether, in actual operation, the exercise of the power to grant copyrights 
by some States will prejudice the interests of other States[,]” the Court explained that “a copyright 
granted by a particular State has effect only within its boundaries.  If one State grants such 
protection, the interests of States which do not are not prejudiced since their citizens remain free to 
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The Court recognized that California’s prohibition on unauthorized 
sound recordings might adversely affect other states in which the practice 
remained legal because those states would no longer be able to export 
unauthorized sound recordings to California.
293
  However, the Court 
concluded, the conflict was “neither so inevitable nor so severe as to 
compel the conclusion, that state power has been relinquished to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.”
294
  Fifteen years later, in Bonito, 
the Court apparently determined that Goldstein’s reasoning did not apply 
to “patent-like” protections.  The Court stated that if states were free to 
grant “patent-like” rights, then they might be tempted to “afford patent-
like protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively 
insulating them from competition from outside the State.”
295
  But the 
Court did not apply or even mention the dormant Commerce Clause, 
even though its potential applicability should have been obvious.
296
  The 
next section provides the doctrine the Supreme Court should have used 
from the start to address patents and patent-like rights granted by the 
states. 
                                                          
copy within their borders those works which may be protected elsewhere.”  Id. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. at 558–59 (“However, this conflict is neither so inevitable nor so severe as to compel 
the conclusion, that state power has been relinquished to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Congress. . . . We do not see here the type of prejudicial conflicts which would arise, for example, if 
each State exercised a sovereign power to impose imposts and tariffs; nor can we discern a need for 
uniformity such as that which may apply to the regulation of interstate shipments.”).  Some argue 
that the Court’s conclusion underestimates the significant impact that a ban on importation of 
“pirated records” would have on the economies of other jurisdictions where the sale of pirated 
tapings was not illegal.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 15, at 750; Edward Samuels, Goldstein v. 
California: Breaking up Federal Copyright Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 969 (1974). 
 295.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 163 (1989).  Presumably, the 
Court was worried that Florida’s ban on copying boat hulls using the direct plug molding process 
with the intent to sell them would operate as a de facto tariff, preventing out-of-state producers of 
plug-molded boat hulls from selling their wares in the state.  The Bonito Court did not mention 
Goldstein’s analogous discussion of the effects of California’s ban on imports of pirated records.  
The Court’s statement in Bonito suggests that it was distinguishing the pirated records example, but 
a meaningful distinction is difficult to see.  Preventing the import of unauthorized copies of sound 
recordings into California benefited California’s sound recording industry at the expense of 
distributors in states where copied sound recordings remained legal.  Preventing the import of boat 
hulls into Florida that were made using the plug molding process benefited Florida’s boat hull 
manufacturers at the expense of out-of-state competitors, such as those in Oklahoma, that could use 
plug molding.  
 296.  The dormant Commerce Clause argument was never raised, even though Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc. was a Tennessee corporation.  After Bonito Boats, Inc. sued Thunder Craft in a Florida 
Circuit Court to enforce the Florida law, Thunder Craft moved to dismiss based only on the ground 
that the statute conflicted with federal patent law.  Id. at 145. 
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c. A Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine for State Patents 
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, courts will strike down state 
laws that facially discriminate against out-of-state entities—for instance, 
by expressly prohibiting out-of-state companies from doing business or 
selling merchandise in the state.
297
  On the other hand, when a party 
challenges a facially neutral state law that has adverse effects on 
interstate commerce, courts apply some variety of balancing test.
298
  
Under the most common variant, the Pike test, the state law “will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
299
 
If a state’s patents are only available, without exception, for local 
companies, these patents would likely be treated as facially 
discriminatory and highly suspect.
300
 On the other hand, if state patents 
are equally available to all innovators regardless of location, state patents 
would not be treated as facially discriminatory incentives.
301
   
As described above, historically, state patents were often granted to 
foreigners.
302
  These patents usually had some form of a local working 
requirement, obligating the patentee to develop the technology in the 
state within a certain period of time to maintain the patent.
303
  But this 
does not imply a requirement of local residency or investment in local 
                                                          
 297.  Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 429 (1980) (explaining the policy at issue, which 
confined the sale of cement to residents).  
 298.  On the balancing tests federal courts use in dormant Commerce Clause cases, see 
BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 
6.05 (2d ed. 2012).  See also Enge, supra note 107, at 347–53 (describing many different tests that 
federal courts have applied).   
 299.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  Under the Pike test, “[w]here the 
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”  Id.  
 300.  See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 383–93 (1994). 
 301.  Although courts may deem state laws that harm both in-state and also out-of-state interests 
facially discriminatory, “[f]or purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause, discrimination is often 
viewed as disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests.”  Jennifer L. Larsen, 
Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 844, 852 (2004).  “In most 
constitutional doctrines a statute is deemed to be facially discriminatory if the prohibited 
discrimination is found on the face of the statute.”  Id. at 861–62.  
 302.   As noted in Part II.B., historically, state and colonial patents were used to encourage 
foreigners to import their inventions to the state issuing the patent.  See NATURE OF THE IP CLAUSE, 
supra note 45, at 45–46. 
 303.   See BUGBEE, supra note 31, at 57–103 (describing variety of working requirements in 
colonial and state patents); Owning Ideas, supra note 33, at 103 (discussing colonial working 
clauses), 109–10 (noting that state patents retained major features of colonial patents). 
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plants and equipment, so long as the patentee has the capacity to function 
in multiple locations and still ensure local working in the granting 
state.
304
  Thus, for example, the holder of a Wyoming patent could be a 
multi-national corporation with its operations located mainly in New 
York and outsourcing most of its work to China.  In contrast, John Fitch, 
a Pennsylvania resident, was unable to meet New York’s working 
requirement, leading to voidance of his steamboat patent in New York.
305
 
State patents that do not facially discriminate against out-of-staters 
should be treated under a balancing test, asking whether the state patent 
imposes a burden on interstate commerce and competition that is “clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
306
  Building on this 
general framework, courts should apply the simple three-part analysis 
proposed below.  Importantly, unlike in Bonito, where the Court asked 
whether the state law over-protected boat hulls in proportion to their 
“technological merit,”
307
 this is not a patent efficiency analysis in 
disguise.  The goal is to locate negative externalities on out-of-state 
residents, or unrepresented minority interests in the state, and undue 
interference with interstate competition.
308
 
                                                          
 304.  The Court has been suspicious of tax credits that only apply to companies that produce 
their goods in the state, see New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988), and state 
laws that require producers to perform functions like processing and inspections in the state prior to 
exporting their products because they deprive out-of-state processors or inspectors of the “local 
demand for their services.” See, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (striking down Arizona statute that 
required all Arizona-grown cantaloupes to be packaged within the state prior to export).  See also 
Dwyer, supra note 282, at 207–08, nn.26–30.  This suggests state patents requiring that R&D or 
production related to the patented invention to occur in the state would be suspect as well.  See also 
discussion of Carbone, infra. 
 305.  Hrdy, State Patents in the Age of Laissez-Faire, supra note 32, at 78. 
 306.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 307.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159 (1989). The Court 
stated: 
The Florida scheme offers this protection for an unlimited number of years to all boat 
hulls and their component parts, without regard to their ornamental or technological 
merit. Protection is available for subject matter for which patent protection has been 
denied or has expired, as well as for designs which have been freely revealed to the 
consuming public by their creators. 
Id.  See also Heald, supra note 237, at 987 (stating the Florida statute in Bonito provided boat 
manufacturers a partial monopoly without determining that the public would benefit from better boat 
designs). 
 308.   See Gillette, supra note 7, at 450, 493 (stating that one general purpose of the Commerce 
Clause is to prevent discrimination against out of state interests and discrimination against politically 
powerless interstate interests based on protectionist policies); Dwyer, supra note 282, at 220–21 
(citing Supreme Court discussion of the built-in protection in-state groups with political power have 
against state monopolization). 
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1. Putative Local Benefits 
First, to determine the strength of the state’s interest in granting the 
patent, courts should consider whether the state rationally believes the 
patent is likely to ensure introduction of a useful innovation that leads to 
specific local benefits.  These local benefits might include solving a local 
problem, a new use for state resources, or environmental conservation.   
In making this assessment, courts should be wary of post hoc state 
patents granted for innovations already available in the state or easily 
purchased in interstate commerce.
309
  For example, in Bonito, Florida 
granted “patent-like” protection for a type of boat hull that was not only 
in the public domain but was already manufactured and sold in the 
state.
310
  This type of protection may indicate that the decision to grant 
the patent resulted from rent-seeking and lobbying by favored local 
industries, rather than a legitimate desire to foster more investment in 
local innovation.
311
 But courts should not necessarily strike down 
individual patents simply because they are granted after-the-fact.  Such 
laws may be designed to reward development costs and thereby create ex 
ante incentives to innovate in the future.
312
  Courts should simply 
scrutinize the record for signs of lobbying or corruption; if those signs 
are absent, then courts must infer that the state law was intended to 
promote the local interest indicated.  In Bonito, the Court found that 
“[t]he sparse legislative history surrounding its enactment indicates that 
[the Florida law] was intended to create an inducement for the 
improvement of boat hull designs.”
313
  This inducement should have 
been sufficient to indicate a putative local benefit existed.  As explained 
                                                          
 309.   See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 119, at 59 (suggesting that post-hoc rewards are less 
likely to encourage taking innovation risks “on the front end” and may be the result of “legislative 
whim or influence”). 
 310.   Bonito, 489 U.S. at 144–45, 159.   
 311.  See id. at 162–63 (noting states could grant patent-like protection to favored home 
industries without national uniformity of intellectual property law).  Coenen suggests that when 
applying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine courts take into account the political process under 
which the patent was granted and are wary of rent-seeking.  Coenen, supra note 121, at 1031–35; 
Daniel T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Takes Us, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 557–58 (2010) 
[hereinafter Coenen, United Haulers].  
 312.  See Lichtman, supra note 15, at 719–23 (arguing the Bonito law created an efficient 
innovation incentive by rewarding the cost and risk involved in undertaking the development of 
better boat hulls). 
 313.  Bonito, 489 U.S. at 158 (citing Fla. H.R. Meeting of Transp. Comm. Tr. (May 3, 1983), 
reprinted at App. 22 (commenting that “there is no inducement for [a] quality boat manufacturer to 
improve these designs and secondly, if he does, it is immediately copied.  This would prevent that, 
and allow him recourse in circuit court”)). 
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in Part V.C., the Court should not have attempted to evaluate the 
efficiency of the state law.
314
 
2. Burden on Interstate Commerce 
Second, the court must determine the burden that the state patent 
places on interstate commerce.  Assuming the state patent does not 
overtly disfavor out-of-state interests, the primary consideration for this 
factor should be whether the patent inhibits competition from out-of-state 
entities.
315
  If the patent affects out-of-state competitors 
disproportionately, then the court should be more likely to strike it down.  
For example, in Bonito, Florida’s “patent like right” had a direct impact 
on a Tennessee corporation, which was prevented from selling boat hulls 
made using plug molds in Florida, while boat hull manufacturers in 
Florida benefitted.
316
  Assuming that the law did not also harm in-state 
sellers of boat hulls using plug molds, this result should have been a sign 
that this might be a “beggar-thy-neighbor” patent for a preferred local 
industry rather than a true innovation incentive.  This may have been 
what the Court found, though the court did not sufficiently address the 
record on this point.
317
 
On the other hand, the fact that a state patent affects only local 
competition and produces no discernible negative effects on out-of-state 
companies should not create a safe harbor.
318
  If the patent’s scope is so 
open-ended that it effectively creates a monopoly in a defined local 
industry then this patent should be far more vulnerable to dormant 
Commerce Clause preemption.    
 For example, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the 
Supreme Court addressed the viability of a “forced use” rule mandating 
purchase of all waste-transfer services from a single, private
319
 contractor 
                                                          
 314.  Wiley, supra note 206, at 302. 
 315.  See S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (stating that 
state regulations that provide an advantage for those in-state and burden those out-of-state have been 
thought to be unconstitutional). 
 316.  Bonito, 489 U.S. at 145. 
 317.  See id. at 163 (stating the lack of uniform federal law on intellectual property would allow 
states to provide patent-like protection to favored state industries). 
 318.  See Larsen, supra note 301, at 852 (explaining view that a regulation is discriminatory if 
the regulation imposes greater economic burdens on those outside the state than those within). 
 319.  A six-member majority of the Court refused to extend the principle of Carbone to a law 
that required citizens to purchase services from a government-owned facility, holding that the 
dormant Commerce Clause does not prevent states from granting exclusive rights to state-run 
utilities companies, so long as the government treats all private competitors alike.  United Haulers 
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and authorizing the contractor to charge tipping fees that exceeded the 
rates of both in-state and out-of-state competitors.
320
  Similar to a state 
patent, one of the main purposes of the forced-use rule in Carbone was to 
allow the town to avoid paying a large, up-front sum (about $1.4 million) 
in order to have the contractor construct the facility on behalf of the 
town.  Instead, the town effectively granted the contractor an exclusive 
right as an alternative form of incentive to supply a costly local good.
321
 
As an illustration, imagine if the Clarkstown law were considered to 
be a “patent” instead of a “forced use” rule.  The patent would be highly 
vulnerable to being struck down because it eliminated nearly all 
competition in the market for local waste-transfer services, whether in-
state or out-of-state.
322
  But imagine instead that the law granted a patent 
not to a supplier of trash collection services but to the local developer of 
a new and untested “plasma gasification” trash disposal system.
323
  In-
state and out-of-state businesses alike would be free to collect trash in the 
state so long as they did so by non-infringing means.  The burden on 
interstate commerce would not be nearly as great and—assuming the 
patent also produces a viable local benefit (i.e. a new and improved 
method of trash collection)—the law should be upheld as a legitimate 
innovation incentive. 
3. Less Restrictive Alternatives 
The final factor courts should consider is whether the state rationally 
believed a state patent, versus some other form of incentive, such as a 
direct payment or a loan, was the best way to encourage successful local 
working of the innovation.
324
  The primary issue to consider in this factor 
                                                          
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342 (2007).  State patents would 
typically be granted to private entities, not state-owned enterprises, so the exception for state-owned 
companies in United Haulers would not on its face apply to most state patents.   
 320.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 387, 392–93 (1994).   
 321.  Id. at 387. 
 322.  See Dwyer, supra note 282, at 208 (discussing dormant Commerce Clause prohibition on 
laws eliminating out-of-state competition). 
 323.  New York is experimenting with a new plasma-gasification disposal system that efficiently 
disposes of garbage while simultaneously recycling metals and creating usable byproducts like 
electricity.  See Randy Leonard, Plasma Gasification Raises Hopes of Clean Energy From Garbage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, at D3. 
 324.  See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393–94 (rejecting Clarkstown’s argument that special financing 
was necessary because Clarkstown could have subsidized the facility through taxes or bonds).  As 
the Sixth Circuit stated in striking down Ohio’s tax credit scheme in Cuno, a state tax provision that 
is found to burden interstate commerce must advance “a legitimate local purpose that cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”  Cuno v. Daimler-Chrysler, Inc., 
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is the level of technological and market uncertainty entailed in generating 
and successfully developing the innovation.  A high level of uncertainty 
would indicate that a patent is a potentially more efficient way to “pay” 
for development than a cash incentive.
325
  On the other hand, a low level 
of uncertainty and, even more so, a known price would indicate that a 
non-patent financing measure would work just as well or better than 
direct payment.  For example, in Carbone, the Court questioned why the 
town did not simply use taxes or issue municipal bonds to finance 
construction of the waste-transfer facility when the $1.4 million price 
had already been determined.
326
  In contrast, in the “plasma gasification” 
hypothetical, calculating how much the innovator would require both to 
recoup costs and also to make a sufficient profit to justify the risk would 
be much more difficult.
327
  The town would have a stronger justification 
for granting a patent for the disposal system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s current preemption doctrine effectively 
eliminates states’ authority to grant “patent-like” rights.
328
  But this 
Article shows that state patents could provide states with a valuable 
alternative to non-patent incentives such as R&D tax credits for 
promoting innovation and economic development in their jurisdictions.  
On the national level, state patents could supplement the U.S. patent 
system’s framework of incentives by providing protection for 
unpatentable innovations or patentable inventions that are difficult to 
commercialize.  States could also generate stores of valuable information 
about the effect of patents in the marketplace and improve the quality of 
patent law by introducing and testing law and policy innovations.
329
  To 
the extent that judicial review is necessary to limit the costs state patents 
                                                          
386 F.3d 738, 743 (2004) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Lindbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) 
(emphasis added)); see also Coenen, United Haulers, supra note 311, at 547. 
 325.  Some economists believe IP is better than non-IP incentives when value and cost are not 
known.  See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 111, at 19.  Robert Merges has argued that uncertainty 
of success is a major factor to consider when deciding whether a U.S. patent involves “nonobvious” 
subject matter that is deserving of a reward.  Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of 
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 43–54 (1992). 
 326.  Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394. 
 327.  See Lichtman, supra note 15, at 702 (noting that an optimal state innovation incentive 
would offer “extra” incentives above the level of development costs to compensate innovators for 
the risk of innovation and help developers internalize preferences for certain goods). 
 328.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 (1989).  
 329. See note 12, supra. 
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impose on other states, courts already have an effective framework for 
case-by-case judicial review under the dormant Commerce Clause, 
making blanket preemption under the Patent Act or the Constitution both 
unnecessary and unwise. 
 
